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Executive summary 
 
Most empirical studies of the child labor versus schooling choice ignore a 
common third option in Africa: to send a child away from the household to 
work elsewhere. The reason for this shortcoming is that most datasets are based 
on household surveys which only provide information on members living in the 
household at the time of the interview. An important part of the child labor 
choice, the decision to send a child away to work, is therefore generally 
ignored in ordinary survey-based studies. This thesis adds to the existing child 
labor literature by focusing on the child labor migration choice. The dataset 
used contains information about all children born from the same mother and 
include their current location and schooling status, as well as the motive they 
had for leaving.  
 
Child labor migration is an important social policy issue in West Africa. The 
practice is common throughout the region and the children involved tend to be 
even more vulnerable than other child workers because they leave the social 
safety nets of family and kin behind. In many West African countries, the 
phenomenon is indiscriminately labeled as child trafficking, but this may be a 
misrepresentation of the situation of many supposedly trafficked children, as 
the motivation, dynamics and conditions may vary greatly from one case to 
another. As a result, numerous anti-trafficking projects have been based on 
poorly documented and unwarranted assumptions about the determinants of the 
practice, and they have until now been largely ineffective. 
 
The model applied to analyze the determinants of child labor migration in this 
thesis is based on three hypotheses for explaining child labor, as proposed by 
Bahlotra and Tzannatos (2003): weak incentives to schooling relative to work 
options, (binding) poverty constraints, and limitations to parental (or agent) 
altruism. The three potential explanations have different policy implications. 
The first would call for improving incentives to education (education policy), 
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the second suggests social policy interventions, while the third would give 
legitimacy to legal measures such as sanctions. What would be an adequate 
mix of these policies? By applying a multinomial logit model to data from 
Benin, indicators for the three hypotheses are tested while controlling for 
cultural and demographic factors.  
 
The results of the analysis only partially support the theory. Incentive structures 
to local labor and schooling turn out to function more or less as expected 
relative to the schooling choice, but not to the child labor migration choice. 
While poverty has the expected impact on increasing the labor migration of 
girls, this is not the case for boys. Credit availability was expected to relax 
poverty constraints, but instead appears to have other functions vis-à-vis the 
child labor migration choice. Features of the child’s agents matter but not 
systematically in accordance with the theory. The fact that better educated 
mothers have a higher propensity to send their daughters away to work and 
better educated household heads a higher propensity to send their sons do raise 
some questions as to the possible limitations to parental altruism, since 
ignorance in their case is harder to blame. But it also raises the question of 
whether (all) child labor migration is as bad as assumed, at least relative to the 
options the child has if staying at home.  
 
The mere complexity of the results should serve as a warning against jumping 
to intuitively appealing but not scientifically supported conclusions on how the 
problem could be addressed. In this sense, it would be advisable to bring up 
some of the issues raised by the research results in a dialogue with 
communities at risk. The thesis concludes by offering suggestions on how to 
define further research in a way that helps clarify some of the core questions 
raised by the study. Based on the lessons from the local dialogue and the results 
from a second survey, a more adequate policy to prevent the harmful aspects of 
child labor migration can be defined in the future.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Every day a large number of West African children leave their rural families in 
search of work. They travel by public cars, by boat, and by foot. They go to 
districts where there is paid work in cash crop production, to the cities, or to 
prosperous neighboring countries like Cote d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Gabon. Some 
leave with a parent or a relative, other family acquaintances, or friends and 
perhaps siblings. Some leave alone, at times without the consent of parents and 
guardians. Some have used the bargaining powers they may have to get the 
permission to go. Others are forced to leave against their will. While many 
return after the harvest season, others will return after the years it took them to 
earn their dowry or to learn a craft, or settle more permanently at the 
destination site. And there are those that will never be heard from again.  
 
Sometimes there has been an intermediary who convinced either the child or 
the family that a prosperous job is waiting for him or her in the city or on a 
commercial farm. Many adventurous children who leave alone or with siblings 
and friends also run into intermediaries of some sort along the way: middlemen 
or good helpers – adults who to a greater or lesser extent benefit from 
facilitating for the child’s relocation and job search.  
 
While some do indeed turn out to have migrated to a better life, welfare 
consequences are serious for most child migrants. The world is not that easy to 
navigate for someone young and inexperienced who has seen little other than 
his or her own village and the local market town, and who has not met people 
other than local traders, own relatives and kinsmen. Rural children separated 
from close family and kin are vulnerable and easy to take advantage of. They 
have poor negotiation skills and rarely any bargaining power when jobs and 
labor conditions are to be negotiated. Even adults and kinsmen who might 
travel along may have limited bargaining powers since they are themselves 
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vulnerable while away from their domestic social networks. As a result, child 
migrants are often exploited or even right out tricked into working for nothing 
or accepting gross abuse. The consequences for a child who is in a process of 
physical, moral and emotional development can be long term and damaging.  
 
Why do families allow their children out on such risky enterprises, and why do 
children themselves decide to leave? Rural poverty is the dominant explanation 
in NGO publications as well as government expositions: child labor migration 
is seen as a crisis coping mechanism for families in temporary or permanent 
distress. The children presumably leave poor communities where there are few 
opportunities for them to aid their destitute families.  
 
Is the explanation really that simple? Is acute crisis really the main trigger for a 
choice that would not have been made under other conditions? Recent 
publications have indicated that several social as well as cultural mechanisms 
may be equally important for the child labor migration decision. This thesis 
aims to test the poverty hypothesis in the context of other potential 
determinants.  
 
 
1.1 Child labor migration in Benin 
 
1.1.1 Basics on Benin 
Benin is a small country in African terms, situated between Togo and Nigeria 
on the West African south cost. With a relatively short coast line it stretches 
towards the Sahel, and the climate changes from humid to dry as one goes 
north. The country is poor, but for the last decades, politically stable. The 
population is composed by a variety of ethnic groups, and while Animism still 
dominates in the rural areas, Christians are found mainly in the south and 
Muslims in the north. Table 1.1 shows some background figures of relevance to 
this thesis.  
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Table 1.1 Core figures for Benin in comparison to West Africa and Sub 
Saharan Africa.  
 Benin West and Central 
Africa 
Sub Saharan 
Africa 
GNI per capita (USD) 510 491 764 
Percent of population under $1 per day 31 54 46 
Ec growth 1990 / 2005 1.4 1.0 1.1 
Population 8,4 357,3 713,4 
Under 5 mortality rate  150 190 169 
Life expectancy 55 46 46 
Adult literacy rate 35 49 62 
Primary school attendance rate boys 60 59 63 
Primary school attendance rate girls 47 52 59 
Secondary school attendance rate boys 19 26 21 
Secondary school attendance rate girls 12 22 20 
HIV/AIDS rate 1.8 3.5 6.1 
Official child labor rate 5-14-year-olds 26 42 37 
Source: State of the World’s Children 2007 
 
Benin has a fairly normal GNI per capita for an African context where a few 
exceptional countries contribute to a somewhat high average. Income 
distribution is better than general, and growth a bit above normal. This “slightly 
above normal” level is also reflected in a lower child mortality rate and a 
higher life expectancy, but not in the area of education. The adult literacy rate 
is low, and both primary and secondary school enrollment rates are in general 
lower than the Sub Saharan African average. Gender differences in education 
are also sharper than typical in Africa. The official child labor rate for Benin is 
of only 26 percent, but there is reason to believe that the estimates are too 
optimistic. Neighboring and socio-culturally fairly similar Togo, for example, 
has an official child labor rate of 63 percent in spite of far higher enrollment 
rates.  
 
1.1.2 Child fostering in Benin 
The circulation of children is considerable in Benin, also in comparison to 
other countries in the region. Table 1.2 shows that between 1.5 and 1.9 percent 
of children 0-2 years old who have at least one parent alive live away from 
both. This rate increases sharply to almost ten percent for the 3 to 5-year-olds, 
to more than 16 percent for the 6 to 9-year-olds, and more than twenty percent 
for the 10 to 14-year-olds.  
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Table 1.2 Fosterhood and orphanhood rates in Benin. 
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0-2 79.8 15.7 1 1.3 0.2 1.4 0.1 0 0 0.4 
3-5 72.4 11.2 1.7 4.2 0.5 8.4 0.5 0.6 0 0.4 
6-9 61.8 9.8 2.5 7.8 0.9 13.5 0.6 2 0.6 0.6 
10-14 52.9 9.5 5.1 8.7 1.5 16.4 1.1 2.9 1 0.9 
Source: DHL, 2001 
 
Table 1.2 also shows that when the parents do not live together, almost all 
young children live with the mother. The share that lives with the father 
increases by the age cohorts, meaning that as children grow some move away 
from the maternal household and go to the father.1 
 
1.1.3 Child labor in Benin 
In 1998 the UNDP office in Benin carried out a detailed time allocation survey 
that included 5275 children between 6 and 17 years old. While table 1.1 shows 
an official child labor rate of 26 percent for Benin, analysis of the UNDP data 
shows that almost 82 percent of children performed at least some sort of work 
(in the formal or informal labor market or housework) during the reference day.  
While 11 percent exclusively went to school, 50 percent only worked, 31 
percent did both and 8 percent neither. Labor participation rates show a rapid 
increase between the ages of 6 and 11 from around 50 to more than 90 percent. 
For the rural areas – the focus of this thesis – the labor participation rate is 
slightly higher, but the total school participation rate is almost 10 percent lower 
than national average. The average number of hours worked (for the children 
who did work) is much higher in rural areas.  
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For this thesis, it will be of particular interest to compare the work day of four 
particular groups of children: (a) rural children who stay with their parents and 
go to school, (b) rural children who stay with their parents without going to 
school, (c) children who live away from home, in both urban and rural areas, 
and go to school, and (d) children who live away from home, in urban as well 
as rural areas, and who do not go to school. Table 1.3 shows the average work 
day of boys, girls and all children in the four categories:  
 
Table 1.3 The average work day for children 6-17 years old (inactive children 
included). 
 Boys Girls Total 
Rural school children living at home (N=764) 2.2 2.9 2.5 
Rural non-school children living at home (N=1516) 4.2 5.7 4.9 
Non-biological children of the household head in school2 (N=392) 1.9 2.6 2.2 
Non-biological children of the household head not in school (N=780) 5.8 8.3 7.4 
Source: UNDP Enquete Emploi du Temps au Benin, 1998 
 
Gender differences are systematic and girls generally work more than boys. 
School children also work, but much less that children who do not go to school. 
Children who live away from home and do not go to school work much more, 
although it must be kept in mind that they are on average a year older than the 
children who stay at home, and this extra year explains some of the increase. 
Children who go to school away from home have an average work day that is 
quite similar to school children living at home.  
 
1.1.4 Child labor migration in Benin 
This thesis is based on a survey of child relocation carried out in Benin in 2000. 
An NGO report derived from the survey showed that as much as 22 percent of 
rural children 6 to 16 years old already had left their parental households. 
When asked directly, parents reported that 9 percent had gone to work, 5 
percent to study, 2 percent to marry and 6 percent for “other reasons”. 
Extrapolations would indicate that about 100,000 children between 6 and 16 
years of age had left their parental households in rural Benin to go and work, 
half of them abroad and the rest in more urban areas of the country. The 
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majority who had gone abroad were boys, while girls more often went to other 
parts of Benin. The boys were on average 11 years old at the time of departure, 
the girls 10. Older children more often went abroad. Most parents stated that 
poverty was the main reason why they had sent their children away.3  
 
 
1.2 Why study child labor migration?  
 
Studying child labor migration is important in its own right because of the 
relative vulnerability of the child labor migrants and the ill faith of many. It 
should be of normative concern to policy makers and can not be ignored by 
those interested in reducing child vulnerability, for instance by influencing 
“unwanted” parental choices with effective policy interventions.  
 
But child labor migration deserves to be analyzed beyond that: child labor 
migration is the missing piece of the puzzle in existing child labor research. 
The child labor choice does in reality have two different outcomes: working 
while living at home and working while living elsewhere. Only the first and 
probably least risky option has this far been studied. Policy advice on child 
labor derived from previous studies is thus impaired by this shortcoming. 
 
Why is that? Since empirical research most often is based on household survey 
data it allows for studying the labor activities of all children who belong to a 
household, including in-fostered children. Most household surveys do not 
question whether there are children born into the household who are no longer 
there. That way they do not permit the study of the parental decision to send a 
biological child away from the primary household to work elsewhere, as an 
alternative to working in its local community or going to school. In other 
words, the child labor choice studied up till now is incomplete and quite 
possibly excludes many of the most risky child labor choices. This will also 
affect the policy advice derived from these studies.  
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As the previous section shows, the numbers of non-orphaned foster children in 
Africa is high, and relatively consistent research findings show that foster 
children work more than their peers. This suggests that sending children off to 
work is a common choice. While many such children can be observed as 
members of households where they work, others are most likely beyond the 
reach of the common household survey because they live in workshops, in 
Koranic schools, in abandoned buildings, in the streets or other public places, 
in more or less temporary housing for workers, at commercial farms, in mining 
areas, brothels, quarries, or even in the bush with criminal gangs and armed 
forces. They do not live in the type of households that would normally be 
sampled in a survey, and even if they do, some are likely to be forgotten when 
the household head lists the household members to the interviewer – they do 
not belong, they are just servants.  
 
Most empirical research on child labor and schooling choices includes a 
dummy variable for whether a household child is a biological child of the 
household head or not. Does this biological relationship explain his or her 
probability of working versus going to school? As section 1.3 will show, 
research results are inconclusive, in particular in rural areas. Two factors 
explain this perhaps counter intuitive result. First, foster children as a group are 
quite heterogeneous, and second, agents other that the household head have 
often participated in making the children’s work or school decision, often even 
prior to them coming to the household. Educational fostering is common 
throughout Africa and especially in the countryside. The higher the element of 
educational fostering, the more schooling and the less work will be found 
among foster children. By using a dummy variable for biological relationship 
to the household head children who have been sent to stay with a relative who 
lives near a school are grouped with child domestic servants and orphans. Child 
labor migrants are therefore not well studied even when living in regular 
households, and sampled by regular surveys.  
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Certain issues related to child labor migration have been approached politically 
through a quite particular angle in West Africa: During the 1990s, a debate 
around alleged child trafficking arose in the international development 
community. ILO drew attention to the fact that many children were working 
under harsh and exploitative conditions away from their families – many even 
outside their own countries. They were found in commercial agriculture, as 
domestic servants, as street vendors and porters, at construction sites and in 
workshops. Rumors flourished that profiting intermediaries had been involved 
in facilitating children’s movement away from the parents and into these 
abusive situations. The use of deception or even force was assumed in most 
cases.  
 
Applying the international definitions and policy regulations of human 
trafficking to the situation resulted in quite a new approach to a practice that 
had developed over decades – perhaps centuries – in the West African region. 
Human rights activists argued that child trafficking is a crime of equal gravity 
regardless of cultural context, and the first wave of policy interventions to help 
curb the practice was therefore mainly of legal and judicial character: new anti-
trafficking laws were developed, police and border patrols were trained to 
identify traffickers, new travel documents were required for children wanting 
to cross borders without their parents. At the community level, village 
surveillance committees were established, funded and supervised by 
international NGOs.  
 
But after a period these interventions were increasingly being questioned. Were 
legal regulations just and adequate if poverty was indeed the trigger for child 
trafficking? And were the interventions effective in reducing the number of 
children relocating? The answer to the latter appeared to be no. Even sharper 
questions were raised: was it possible that all the new laws and regulations that 
had been put in place had instead led to more corruption, with the cost being 
borne by the poor?4 
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A more fundamental concern followed: did the (facilitated) labor migrations of 
children in the region indeed match the definitional criteria for trafficking in 
the first place? As the debate went on, the international definition of the 
trafficking concept underwent several changes and became gradually more 
extensive. While earlier definitions were not particularly suitable to capture 
distinctions in different West African practices, the newer definitions were 
more liberal and appeared to aim to include a larger share of the potential risk 
cases.5  
 
Alongside this process of definitional adaptation came the development of an 
increased understanding of the complexity of the issue. A number of qualitative 
studies were commissioned by NGOs and international agencies, and above all, 
parts of the international community relaxed somewhat on the principle of 
treating anything resembling trafficking as a crime and opened their ears to 
local interpretation, cultural and social explanations. Yes, many children did 
relocate in the area, and on the way they were assisted by adults with more or 
less selfish motives. But how else would they travel? The adults helping them 
out on the way did not appear to be particularly well organized, nor criminals 
specializing in clandestine operations. Instead they were often local traders 
who were traveling in that direction anyway and who might as well bring a 
child along for a small fee. They were village- and kinsmen with contacts in 
commercial agriculture or urban centers and who could use their networks to 
find the child a job – against a small fee or favor. In contrast to trafficking into 
prostitution, the profitability of the labor markets these children were entering 
was so low that they could hardly be interesting to organized crime of any 
proportion.6  
 
Opening up for the possibility that these children were not primarily the victims 
of trafficking was politically controversial. The “child slaves to cocoa”7, the 
“Etireno slave ship”8 and other similar cases had long made great newspaper 
headlines. Moreover, the dramatic sound of the “trafficking” word had been 
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helpful in raising funds. Media attention has a tendency to drop, accompanied 
by shrinking funding, as soon as poverty replaces crime as a principal 
explanation for a phenomenon.  
 
Several different child labor practices remain an issue of concern in Africa. 
International as well as national legal instruments designed to address 
unwanted child labor have proven to be difficult to enforce in societies where 
families – not factories or plantations – are the primary employers of children. 
In Africa poverty therefore remains the ruling explanation for the most 
common child labor practices. When children work away from their 
households and families they are normally more at risk and less protected than 
when they work around their homes. The ruling assumption therefore remains 
that only acute distress would force families to expose their children to this 
increased vulnerability.  
 
At the policy level, social policy interventions to reduce poverty in rural 
communities at risk have increased. Microfinance, projects funding income 
generating activities for women, and rural development projects are used to 
help reduce the early expulsion of children from parental households.  
 
The issue of child labor migration has also become connected to the schooling 
situation in many rural areas. Although schools are generally not too far away 
to most rural children, a mere glance at some of those schools explains a lot: 
many have mud walls and dirt floors, and caving straw-and-dirt roofs hanging 
so low that an adult can barely stand upright inside. In addition, poor teachers, 
sexual harassment of girls, irrelevant curriculum, school vacations poorly 
coordinated with local harvest seasons, and the demand for “irregular” and 
illegal school fees by underpaid staff largely explain the unattractiveness of the 
available schooling choice. If on top of it there is a low child labor demand and 
the return to local child labor is marginal, the incentive structure is in place for 
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sending children away from home earlier than they would under better local 
conditions.  
 
Awareness and sensitization programs have also been implemented. Perhaps 
there is ignorance to the risks the children are exposed to. Perhaps parental 
attitudes are misguided. And perhaps communication can change some of this.   
 
Policy aimed to increase school attendance, reduce child labor and reduce child 
vulnerability overall must be guided by adequately designed research. It is in 
the first place greatly challenging to regulate a production system where 
families and households are the main economic units, as is the case in rural 
Africa. Better understanding the relationship between the various factors that 
determine child labor migration will help to better assess the effectiveness of 
different policy interventions that are currently being proposed and undertaken 
by governments and aid organizations. There is therefore a need for a 
systematic identification of the effects of various potential determinants. With 
such knowledge child welfare policies of relevance to child labor migrants can 
be adjusted and improved. What policies are likely to work more effectively to 
protect children at risk, and under what conditions? This thesis aims to give 
partial answers to these questions.  
 
 
1.3 Relevant research references  
 
While scholars from many disciplines have studied children’s labor for 
decades, the quantitative research literature on child labor expanded 
considerably after economists started taking an interest in the topic about ten 
years ago. During the end of the 1990s and beginning of the new millennium a 
bulk of econometric analyses of child labor participation in African countries 
was produced.  
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This section will mainly refer to the approaches and findings from Ghana by 
Canagaraja and Coulombe (1998), Blunch and Verner (2000) and Bhalotra and 
Heady (2001), Cote d’Ivoire by Coulombe (1998) and Grootaert (1998), 
Zambia by Nielsen (1998), and Ethiopia by Cockburn (2000). Good summaries 
of the global results have been presented by many others, for example Bhalotra 
and Tzannatos (2003) and Canagarajah and Nielsen (1998). This thesis 
therefore places a particular focus on synthesizing their findings for the rural 
areas, which are most relevant to the analysis that follows. The operational 
definitions of child labor are diverse in the studies, the age ranges of the 
children are different, and the equation variables also vary quite a bit. This, in 
addition to country specificities, probably explains many of the differences in 
the results. References will also be made to more theoretical contributions 
(notably Basu (1999)) and non-economic literature of particular relevance (like 
Bradley (1993) and Reynolds (1991)). For a more comprehensive summary of 
multidisciplinary research conclusions on child labor in Africa, see Bass (2004) 
or Kielland and Tovo (2006). 
 
1.3.1 Child labor and schooling 
Child labor and schooling are often presented as the two alternative choices for 
children’s time use, but it is increasingly clear that they are neither mutually 
exclusive nor exhaustive categories (Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003)). Many 
children combine going to school with working, and a few do neither. Children 
who combine school with labor may have their performance affected by their 
work load, as documented in Ghana by Heady (2003). When children remain 
idle in rural Africa, this is probably due to illness or a situation of un- or under-
employment, the latter quite common, particularly in the agricultural low-
seasons. In most datasets the “idling” category is likely to comprise a high 
number of children who work in and around their own households in types of 
activities that are not locally regarded as “real” labor by those reporting on 
their activities.9  
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In empirical analyses, incentives to schooling are typically measured by 
indicators of costs (proxied by official and unofficial fees, school material, 
textbooks and/or uniforms), quality (proxied by quality of school buildings, 
relevance of curriculum and/or teacher/student ratio), and access/transportation 
costs (proxied by variables like distance to school in minutes/km, presence of a 
road and/or availability of public transport). Few analyses have indicators of all 
three, something that appear to affect the results. Measuring the opportunity 
costs to schooling have also been attempted, for instance by including 
indicators of child labor demand or estimates of child wages.  
 
Almost all the papers have indicators of access to primary school. Both Nielsen 
(1998) and Blunch and Verner (2000) measure access in minutes, and find that 
distance increases child labor participation.10 Coloumbe finds that distance 
measured in km increases child labor in Cote d’Ivoire, while Canagaraja and 
Coulombe (1998) find the same indicator not statistically significant for Ghana. 
Grootaert (1998), comparing a probit to a logit model, finds that fewer children 
combine school and work when the distance is more than one but less than 5 
km, arguing that the long distance leaves too little time for both. His logit 
model also shows a significant increase in the probability that children only 
work when the distance to school is between 1 and 5 km.11 Noticeably, 
however, he also finds statistical significance for more school and less work 
when the distance surpasses 5 km. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find that the 
presence of a primary school has no impact, but a middle or secondary school 
in the community reduces child labor. Using “presence of public transport” as 
an indicator of transportation costs, they also find that it reduces the child labor 
probability for girls.12  
 
While Nielsen (1998) finds the costs of schooling to increase labor 
participation and reduce schooling in Zambia, Coloumbe (Cote d’Ivoire) and 
Canagaraja and Coloumbe (Ghana) find that costs actually increase school 
participation. The most likely explanation is that while Nielsen (1998) also 
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includes a measurement of quality (that reduces labor and increases 
schooling), this control is not a part of the two other equations. The cost 
variable therefore most likely also serves as a relatively robust proxy to school 
quality in countries with substantial quality differences between public and 
private schools. Grootaert (1998) finds no impact of costs in the probit 
approach, but his multinomial logit model shows schooling costs to increase 
the probability that children only work.  
 
The effects of the availability and costs of schooling on child labor choices are 
perhaps not as strong and systematic as one could expect. Schooling indicators 
not surprisingly show a much stronger and more significant impact on the 
schooling decision than on child labor. The conclusion must be that schooling 
features also affect the remaining option for children: poor access and high 
costs increases the number of children performing unregistered domestic work 
or idle in and around their own households.  
 
1.3.2 Child labor and poverty 
Poverty is a strong determinant for the lack of schooling of African children. 
While poverty is also the most intuitively appealing explanation for child labor, 
it has systematically shown a weak or even non-existing impact on child labor 
participation in the empirical research – in particular in rural areas. This has led 
to the development of several possible explanations:  
 
First, the wages or utility of child labor constitute part of a household’s income, 
consumption, expenditures and wealth, and most wealth measurements are thus 
endogenous in the child labor equation. On a methodological level it is 
therefore argued that such endogeneity causes an upward bias in the wealth 
coefficient, and that its limited impact must be understood partly as a result of 
model insufficiencies (Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003)). This challenge can be 
met by statistically instrumenting the endogenous independent variable. 
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Second, on a theoretical level it is pointed out that the most logical place to 
invest available resources in poor rural communities is in labor intensive assets 
like land and livestock. Ownership to such assets in turn increases labor 
demand and thus the marginal return to child labor in an environment of un- 
and underemployment. Opportunity costs to schooling thereby augment. To 
specify these theoretical deliberations, the “wealth paradox” concept is 
introduced, arguing that given multiple market failures, land and asset rich 
households will have a higher child labor demand and higher opportunity costs 
to schooling than presumably poorer households with few or no productive 
assets. This stresses the need to include measurements of asset ownership in 
addition to wealth measurements in the regression equation (Bhalotra and 
Heady (2001)).  
 
Third, from the sociological and anthropological fields, child labor is 
understood more in terms of socialization and skills training, something that 
would place more importance on non-economic causes (e.g. Castle and Diarra 
(2002) and Reynolds (1991)). 
 
It is important to keep in mind that most empirical analyses of child labor in 
rural areas in Africa in reality study the variation among households that are all 
relatively poor: rural African households are in general so constrained and at 
such a constant risk that even the “better off” among them may find it 
unaffordable to eliminate child labor all together. Wealth would probably have 
shown a stronger impact if the relative variations between poor and rich had 
been greater.  
 
In her analysis of Zambia, Nielsen (1998) finds that landownership increases 
the probability of a child working – for a rural 13-year-old by as much as 20 
percent. Wealth, measured by household expenditures per adult, reduces the 
likelihood. The impact is however marginal, although larger in rural than urban 
areas: an income increase of 35 percent would for instance only reduce child 
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labor by 3-5 percent in an average rural community. On a national level she 
concludes that a real growth of 2 percent per year through 15 years only would 
reduce child labor by one fifth.   
 
Coulombe (1998) also finds that child labor increases with land ownership and 
land size, while he finds no significant effect of his (statistically instrumented) 
wealth variable at all. Even more surprising, Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998) find a weak positive impact of expenditures per capita (log) for Ghana, 
in fact, they find the relationship between wealth and child labor to be inversely 
u-shaped. The logical explanation would be that a certain income level is 
required before a further wealth increase can be expected to reduce child labor. 
Before reaching this wealth level, earnings may be invested in productive 
assets that lead to an increased child labor demand. Contesting their findings, 
Blunch and Verner (2000) utilize a different dataset for Ghana. They create a 
wealth index and find a more systematic impact of wealth, although the effect 
is admittedly “somewhat small” (p13). Also their study concludes that assets 
like cattle, sheep and land increase child labor, the latter only for boys. The two 
datasets for Ghana are however strikingly different. While the former operates 
with a child labor rate of 28 percent, the latter only defines around 3 percent of 
children as child laborers. Comparison of research results on child labor is in 
general quite sensitive to how child labor is operationally defined, and 
therefore to the types of tasks that are included in the child labor definition.13 
 
Grootaert (1998) does not include the land ownership variable in his regression 
for rural areas. His poverty estimate is a dummy for whether the household 
falls into the poorest quintile. In his sequential probit he finds no significant 
effect on the “only school” or “only work” choices, but the probability of 
children combining work and school is reduced if the child’s household is 
among the poorest 20 percent. In the multinomial logit analysis he finds that 
while fewer children combine work and school, more children only work or 
idle if the household is poor.14 
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Bhalotra and Heady (2001) only look at farm labor, and conclude that the 
wealth paradox presented in the introduction to this section is stronger for girls. 
While land ownership increases girls labor, wealth (measured by instrumented 
food expenditures) reduces it. The number of plots owned by a household 
increases the probability of farm labor for both boys and girls.  
 
Cockburn (2000) makes the most detailed study of how child labor is affected 
by household ownership of various assets. He does not include an income 
variable per se, and many of the results are not statistically significant. The 
tendencies are however clear across a range of sub-samples: certain assets are 
child labor demanding (notably small live stock and land), while others are 
labor saving (oxen, bulls, ploughs, high land quality and proximity to a source 
of water).  
 
Only Nielsen (1998) includes credit access in the regression equation. Credit 
should help relax the effect of poverty constraints, in particular when these are 
related to temporary income fluctuations. She finds that (formal) bank credits 
help reduce the probability that a child works, e.g. for a rural 13-year old by 6.6 
percent. Informal credits are not statistically significant to the child labor 
choice. Interestingly, neither credit type is important for children’s school 
participation. 
 
1.3.3 Child labor and agency 
Children are normally not the agents of their own labor supply, at least not as 
long as they live in their parental households or are in the care of others. The 
features of the parents therefore matter in the decision on child labor and 
schooling. In economic theory, households are often regarded as unitary 
models where income, preferences and responsibilities are pooled and 
organized as effectively as possible. It is a common theoretical assumption that 
such households are altruistic vis-à-vis their children (Basu (1999)).  
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The assumption of a unitary household decision is on the other hand probably 
too simplistic in the case of child labor in rural areas. It is instead increasingly 
common to assume that a household bargaining process takes place, and that 
fathers and mothers have different preferences in this bargaining game (Iversen 
(2002a), Balsvik (1995), Udry, C. (1996), Alderman et al (1995), Ilahi (2000), 
Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999)). Parental features like age and education 
can be interpreted as proxies to the relative bargaining powers of mothers and 
fathers.  
 
It is likely that many children participate in the bargaining process, directly or 
indirectly. The child’s influence depends on age, gender, maturity and other 
personality related indications of (relative) bargaining power that are normally 
unobservable in survey data (Iversen (2002a)). Some model children’s 
bargaining participation through a mother-child nexus (Grootaert (1998)), 
indicating the strong relationship commonly assumed between women’s and 
children’s preferences (“mother is more altruistic”). Bradley (1993) challenges 
this assumption and points out that there is indeed also a conflict of interest 
between women and children since women are likely to have to do the low 
status child labor in and around the household if children are sent to school. 
Andvig (1997) argues that compulsory schooling in this respect in fact 
constitutes an indirect taxation of women.  
 
The theoretical principle of parental altruism is also challenged by empirical 
research that for instance shows that adult labor supply is indeed endogenous in 
the child labor equation: it is not so that parents always provide the same 
amount of labor, while child labor comes in addition in times of constraint. 
Parents often work less when their children work more (Bhalotra 2000). The 
limited impact of poverty on child labor participation presented in the previous 
section can therefore also be interpreted as an indicator of parental altruism 
being relative. Poverty involving child labor can then be read as a potential 
result of parental “laziness” – more elegantly put by Bhalotra and Tzannatos 
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(2003:p9) who state that: “…if poverty is measured by adult income then what 
appears to be a poverty constraint might in fact be relaxed under greater 
parent altruism”.  
 
Perhaps the most precise way to study parental altruism is to look at the 
distribution of household consumption. How is consumption distributed 
between adult-related and child-related expenditures in households applying 
child labor and households that don’t? And how does a marginal increase in 
household consumption affect the ratio of child-related versus adult-related 
consumption (Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003))? An interesting finding in the 
altruism debate is that households that consume alcohol and tobacco are more 
likely to have children working and less likely to have children in school 
(Bhalotra (2001), Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999)). 
 
Are mothers more altruistic than fathers? In a 10-country study it is 
documented that paternal orphans go more to school than maternal orphans, 
when controlling for the fact that the latter tend to live in wealthier households 
(Case et al 2002). Grootaert (1998) shows that when one of the parents works 
in the formal sector, the probability that the household children work increases. 
The mother having a job outside the household increases the probability that 
her daughters work, presumably to substitute for her labor in household chores. 
The latter case should exemplify the interest conflict between women and 
children described by Andvig (1997) and Bradley (1993). 
 
Four of the seven empirical analyses scrutinized in this section have the gender 
of the household head as one of the variables, and the results generally do not 
support the notion of there being a mother-child nexus. Having a female 
household head is generally not statistically significant in the labor equation in 
rural areas, but Grootaert (1998) finds that having a female household head 
reduces the chance that children go to school. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find 
that girls’ probability of working increases with a female household head, 
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while Nielsen (1998) finds the same for the combined urban-rural sample. 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) find that while mother’s presence in the 
household is without importance for schooling and work, the presence of the 
father increases the probability of schooling and reduces the probability of 
work for the children. Cockburn (2000) finds a tendency towards more 
education and less work for children of female-headed households across all 
his sub-samples, but the results are generally not statistically significant. 
 
Age and education most likely represent experience and knowledge, and should 
lead to better informed choices. If in particular agent education does not reduce 
child labor, other things held constant, one should either question altruism or 
take a close look at the quality and incentives to the alternatives. Age and 
education are as mentioned used to proxy agents’ relative bargaining power in 
the household bargaining game over child labor and schooling choices. Would 
then the impact of fathers’ age and education be any different from that of the 
mothers? Nielsen (1998) does not include mothers in her analysis, but finds 
that father’s age and education reduce child labor and increase schooling. 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) and Coulombe (1998) find no such impact 
of parental education on the child labor choice, unless the father has post 
secondary education. Grootaert (1998) finds a different impact on boys and 
girls: while father’s education increases the probability that a boy combines 
school and work, it reduces the probability that girls do so, while it is 
statistically insignificant for all other choices. Mother’s education increases 
both the “only school” and the combined “school and work” likelihood for 
boys, but reduces the probability that girls go to school. This fits well with the 
same equation finding that if the mother works in the formal sector the 
likelihood that girls work increases, thus stressing the interest conflict between 
mother and daughter. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find no impact of the father’s 
education but mother’s education reduces the likelihood that boys work. 
Cockburn (2000) finds that the age of the household head reduces girls work 
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and increases their schooling probability, but has no effect for boys. The 
education of the household head reduces work and increases schooling for all. 
 
In short, results are inconclusive. Parental education and age generally increase 
the likelihood of schooling and reduce the likelihood of work, but the evidence 
that mother’s bargaining power somehow should lead to more altruistic 
decisions is not clear. While this may be caused by an interest conflict between 
women and children, it is also natural to assume that the more or less imperfect 
wealth measurements applied in the various models leave room for multiple 
spurious effects being captured by e.g. the “female household head” variable, 
since female-headed households are generally poorer than others. Even with 
perfect income or wealth indicators, the “female household head” variable is 
likely to express household vulnerability in traditional societies, where a 
female-headed household will have a more restricted access to influence, 
credits, jobs and insurance arrangements (Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003:p43)). 
One can therefore not plainly reject the assumption that mothers are more 
altruistic in the child labor decision based on these findings. 
 
When analyzing ordinary household survey data, expectations of altruism 
should also be relaxed for another reason: Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) point 
out that an increasing number of children live in households where their parents 
are not household heads, and many live away from their parents all together, 
for instance orphans. Their agents – or at least some of the more powerful 
participants in the bargaining process over their choices – can therefore not be 
expected to be as altruistic as the biological parents might have been. Referring 
to Hamiltons rule, Case et al (2002) find that the outcome for orphans depend 
largely on the degree of relatedness of the orphan to the household head.15  
 
Most of the empirical analyses include a dummy for whether the child is the 
biological child of the household head or a foster child. While foster children 
are often found to be working somewhat more and going less to school, this 
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relationship is often not statistically significant to the surprise of many analysts. 
More clarity is reached when segregating the urban from the rural households. 
While urban findings generally concur with Hamilton’s rule, they are often 
opposite in rural areas. The explanation is the high element of educational 
fostering in many rural areas: the foster child is not an unfortunate child sent 
away from home, but rather the smart kid who needs to continue his or her 
education and therefore has been moved to the relative living closer to a 
(better) school. This heterogeneity – in particular among rural foster children – 
is often overlooked by scholars. In their rural sub-samples, Nielsen (1998) 
finds that non-biological children go more to school. Coloumbe and 
Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) find the relationship to the household head 
to be statistically insignificant in rural areas, but in the urban areas Hamilton’s 
rule is confirmed. Blunch and Verner (2000) find that non-biological boys 
work less in rural areas, while again Hamilton’s rule is confirmed for urban 
girls. Cockburn (2000) as well as Bhalotra and Heady (2001) find the opposite: 
non-biological sons of the household head work more, while girls’ labor 
participation is not affected by their relationship to the household head. Their 
deviant findings may be explained by their somewhat different definition of 
child labor: both studies focus on agrarian households, and mainly the 
participation in farming. First, school participation rates are generally lower in 
farm households, and second, farm households will be underrepresented among 
rural households who take in foster children for educational fostering.  
 
Before concluding the section on parental altruism a final question deserves to 
be raised: is it is reasonable to assume that altruism means the same to rural 
peasant parents in Africa as it does to Western scholars? Quite obviously not.  
It is indeed quite likely that work is perceived as a good, not bad, in many 
situations and settings. This would in particular be the case where extra income 
is badly needed and work is difficult to obtain. Also this debate is largely 
ignored in current empirical research, sometimes leading to a limited 
understanding of findings. Guarcello et al (2004) for instance are surprised to 
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find a low impact of orphanhood on child labor, and that orphanhood increases 
the share of children who are inactive. If child labor is seen is a good instead of 
a drawback, it makes sense that those with good networks and contacts 
compete better for the jobs available.  
 
Child labor can also help the socialization of a labor discipline that can be of 
fundamental importance for survival in tough places like the African 
countryside. Reynolds (1991:p106) for instance writes about girls work: “The 
ethos of womanliness is “the dull compulsion” of daily work. Girls are 
reluctant apprentices. A woman’s duty is to bind her daughter into service in 
order to secure her future as a farmer and a useful servant in the kinship 
network.” Coaching children into even very hard labor may thus indeed be 
viewed as altruistic, rightfully or not.  
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2. Theory  
 
“At least as important a shortcoming is that empirical research [on 
child labor] has been conducted without adequate reference to theory. 
As a result, the estimated equations are sometimes mis-specified, and 
often difficult to interpret. This impedes the confidence with which 
policy prescriptions can be applied”. 
 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003:Abstract16)  
 
 
What causes child labor migration? The various ongoing and proposed policy 
interventions aiming to curb the practice all derive from some more or less well 
founded hypotheses of what causes it. Together these hypotheses can be seen 
as forming a more informal theory of child labor migration, but a more 
formalized theoretical approach has not yet been defined. 
 
A theory of child labor migration could be inspired by theories of child labor, 
adult migration or child fostering, and many of the core elements of the three 
approaches are indeed similar. This thesis takes its point of departure in child 
labor theory, but remains inspired also by theoretical approaches within the 
other fields. This choice is made for a few key reasons: First, unlike adult 
migration, the decision of a child’s labor migration is likely to be made 
primarily by others than the migrant him or herself, probably in a bargaining 
setting where the child has some but mostly not decisive influence. Moreover, 
the adult migrant is normally not facing the labor versus education choice. 
Second, while child fostering has multiple purposes and functions (Akresh 
2003), child labor migration is less complex, at least in principle. Third, many 
of the methodological concerns revealed in the literature on child labor are 
indeed very relevant for child labor migration. The latter will be thoroughly 
discussed in the next chapter.  
 26
In their 2003 paper, Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) outline a basic theoretical 
model for empirical analysis of child labor participation. This model, with 
relatively small adjustments and amendments, seems suitable for empirical 
approaches to child labor migration as well.  
 
What exactly is child labor and how could child labor migration be defined? 
None of these concepts are straightforward, but can be more precisely 
understood on the background of various existing definitions as well as 
definitions of related concepts. Before turning the focus to the theoretical 
model, some such definitions will be presented.  
 
 
2.1 Central definitions 
 
2.1.1 Child labor 
A child is by the UN convention for the rights of the child defined as any 
human being below the age of 18, and labor would in economic terms be 
understood as one in three factors contributing to production (the other two 
being land and capital).  
 
In recent reports ILO defines child labor with point of departure in the so-
called Minimum Age Convention 138 as17: “For 5 to 11 year-olds: all children 
at work in economic activity.” ILO does not define household chores in own 
household as economic activities. “For 12 to 14 year-olds: all children at work 
in economic activity, minus those in light work.” Light work is defined as non-
hazardous work for up till 14 hours a week. Hazardous work in its turn is “any 
activity or occupation which can lead to adverse effects on the child’s safety, 
health, and moral development.” “For 15 to 17 year-olds: all children in the 
“worst forms” of child labor.” The unconditional worst forms are, according to 
ILO convention 182; slavery, trafficking, bondage, serfdom and forced 
compulsory labor, child soldiering, child prostitution and use of children in 
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drug smuggling and other criminal activities. In addition comes “work which, 
by its nature or the circumstances in which it is carried out, is likely to harm 
the health, safety or morals of children”.18 
 
While not all work activities of children are understood as bad, the concept 
“child labor” is in rhetorical terms used to refer to work activities that are 
somehow harmful and unwanted. Conversely, the term “child work” is by 
some proposed used to describe harmless activities. Others use the term “child 
work” to describe all productive activities undertaken by children, and among 
them some can be classified as child labor. In the latter case, the counterpart to 
child labor is termed “light work” and should be condoned.  
 
The definitions remain guiding and normative for empirical research because 
they are difficult to operationalize. Most empirical data lack the necessary 
information to distinguish accurately between the various types, and 
subsequently the terms “child labor” and “child work” are used 
indiscriminately. What exactly is counted as child labor varies greatly from 
study to study. Some include only labor performed in the formal labor market, 
and that way exclude the majority of child work in Africa. Most include non-
remunerated work in the informal labor market, while the most recent also 
acknowledge the importance of including domestic chores.19 While some 
datasets have information on hours worked (and even tasks performed) the 
most common ones ask whether the child performed some sort of work in a 
given reference week or period.  
 
The distinction between child labor and child work is also arguably simplistic. 
While it may be indicative of abuse, reality is often less black and white, and 
more a question of gray shades, or, as argued by Pierik and Houwerzijl 
(2006:p202), it is more like a continuum from the least to the most tolerable 
forms of work than a strict dichotomy. 20 
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2.1.2 Child trafficking 
Child labor migration in West Africa is confounded with the trafficking 
concept throughout policy and literature, and many of the core contributions to 
the child migration debate indeed stem from studies that initially intended to 
study what was assumed to be child trafficking. Defining child trafficking is 
therefore of concern to this thesis. Child trafficking is one of the so called 
“worst forms” of child labor according to ILO Convention 182, article 3(a). 
Beyond that, a myriad of definitions exist, many are similar with only small 
linguistic distinctions. In spite of disagreement and regional objections, the so 
called Palermo Protocol remains the official reference point for defining child 
trafficking:21 
 
“Trafficking in children shall mean the recruitment, transportation, 
transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of 
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation 
of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, 
forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, 
servitude or the removal of organs.” 
 
Other (older) definitions include the precondition that a transaction takes place, 
and concepts like force, deception, fraud, coercion, violence and deprivation of 
freedom of movement are emphasized. This is left out by the Palermo Protocol, 
making the definition much more extensive – but also more difficult to apply. 
The new approach does not assume border crossing. Trafficking can thus take 
place within a country, and traffickers do not need to be organized to be legally 
prosecuted.22  
 
The main challenge of the Palermo definition is that it raises a range of new 
definitional questions, and the answers are unclear. The content of 
“exploitation” remains a main topic for debate, and what exactly is “forced 
labor”, “slavery like practices” and “servitude” in an African context? It is 
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furthermore difficult to prove the criminal intent of the various facilitators 
along the routs of migrating children.  
 
Links between migration, human smuggling and trafficking are evident. 
Unicef’s research center ICDC (2004) argues that migrants may be abducted by 
what they perceived to be smugglers, and end up in trafficking. The US State 
department, however, stresses that while smuggling generally happens with the 
consent of the person in question, fraud, force or coercion are obligatory 
elements in trafficking.23 For research purposes, the operationalization of the 
trafficking concept remains difficult.24  
 
2.1.3 Migration 
Migration refers to a relocation of groups or individuals and is a concept that 
can be defined along several dimensions. There is no universally accepted 
typology of migration flows (Nkamleu (2006)). It is common to define 
migration in i) temporal aspects, referring to both distance and duration of the 
relocation (seasonal/short term/long term), while ii) the spatial aspects refer to 
whether the relocation goes from urban to rural areas, from rural to urban or 
take place between two rural or two urban locations.  
 
Nkamleu (2006) also refers to chain and group migrations which are relevant to 
this study and common throughout West Africa. Chain migrations in particular, 
assume that members of a community or a family have relocated to a certain 
area over time, perhaps over generations. Children as particularly vulnerable 
migrants can thus more easily rely on the assistance of relatives, friends, 
relatives or friends of friends, and others from the home community both 
during the relocation process and in the destination area. Group migrations are 
often more related to exogenous covariate shocks (shocks hitting whole 
communities), and in certain areas of West Africa families may send children 
on group migration as a risk coping mechanism, for instance following a bad 
harvest or epidemic disease. 
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2.1.4 Child labor migration 
There is no official definition of “child labor migration”. Children should, 
however, qualify as labor migrants the same way adults do, given that they 
perform child labor at the destination site, and that this explicitly or implicitly 
was part of the motive for relocating. Child labor migration can, similarly to 
adult migration, be seasonal, short-term or long-term, be an integral part of 
chain and group migrations, and can be triggered by push as well as pull 
factors. Child labor migration differ from child trafficking by the fact that the 
child or at least the child’s family voluntarily agrees to the relocation, but 
would in a West African context inevitably comprise quite some cases 
characterized by labor exploitation, coercion and deception.  
 
Child fostering practices in West Africa were described in section 1.1.2 of this 
thesis and are no doubt related to the child migration situation. Child migrants 
often go to stay and/or work with relatives and kind, but this does not change 
the fact that they leave their parental households and home communities 
searching for work and a better life, similar to adult migrants. It can be argued 
that the tradition of circulating children within extended families makes the 
migrant label somehow alien to many in a West African setting. But the fact 
that most West African foster children are treated quite differently from the 
children in the households where they stay and work – notably, they work more 
– should indicate that their exodus often can be interpreted at least as a step in 
an early emancipation process. Since more recent interpretations of the child 
labor concept comprise domestic and informal market chores, the activities of 
the children in question are no doubt to be regarded as child labor. At the same 
time, the labor migration of a child plays a role in a household’s risk 
management scheme in many of the same ways as the migration of an adult 
household member would. Not only does the child some times send money 
back home – the labor migration also functions as a part of the collective 
portfolio management of the household. It can thus be argued that most foster 
children who work and are not in school can be considered labor migrants.  
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A main difference between a child labor migrant and an adult labor migrant 
stems from the child’s relative vulnerability and inexperience. Besides being 
less capable of negotiating a reasonable labor agreement and beyond that a 
decent life situation, children are also more vulnerable to development harm 
and to the long time consequences of being deprived of formal education.   
 
 
2.2 Model specifications 
 
So far, few attempts have been made to construct an optimal model for 
analyzing child labor migration empirically.25 In this context it makes sense to 
start out with a current standard regression equation for analyzing child labor 
participation. The road towards the most recent models has been paved with 
challenges, and these challenges are well synthesized in Bhalotra and 
Tzannatos’ 2003 paper: Child Labor: What have we learnt? In this chapter 
their basic model is outlined and adapted to the child labor migration context. 
In the next chapter some methodological challenges for applying the model 
will be further addressed.   
 
2.2.1 Three central hypotheses: Incentive, Constraint and Agency 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) present three main hypotheses to explain the 
child labor choice. Together they constitute the core of a model that could also 
be a promising point of departure for explaining child labor migration 
decisions. The main difference between the child labor model and the model 
for child labor migration is that instead of looking at a labor/school/leisure 
choice, there are in principle six possible and qualitatively different outcomes 
when counting in child labor migration, as summarized in the matrix in table 
2.1. These six outcomes are defined by adding a second dimension to the 
original three outcomes: whether the child is living at home or has gone 
elsewhere.  
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Table 2.1 Outcome matrix for the labor/school/leisure choice, defined by 
where the child lives. 
 School Labor Leisure 
Home (a) (c) (e) 
Elsewhere (b) (d) (f) 
 
In the labor migration equation proposed for this analysis the matrix is 
simplified so that there are three possible outcomes to be considered. First, 
category (a) and (b) are organized in one “schooling” category. Second, option 
(d), labor elsewhere, is singled out as the focus category for the study. Finally, 
options (c) and (e) are grouped into a residual category of children who stay in 
the home community to work or idle, while category (f) is excluded due to data 
limitations. 
 
Most children will have at least some leisure time, but the theoretical 
possibility that the rural Beninese child will neither study nor work at all is 
relatively slim, as the UNDP data presented table 1.3 showed. The “leisure” 
option is thus more interesting in analyses based on data with information on 
how many hours of work or study a child has compared to the number of hours 
for leisure and rest. The leisure category is less relevant when the question is as 
simple as whether a rural Beninese child attends school, works at home or 
works elsewhere.26  
 
From a child welfare perspective, ranking the various choices is not 
straightforward, but it can at least be assumed that schooling is the preferable 
option, as it would be in child labor theory. Being sent away to work is a mixed 
blessing: while it may open up for the possibility of higher earnings, better 
work conditions, as well as new experiences and learning, it also indisputably 
renders a child more vulnerable to be away from family and kin. Risks of 
exploitation are heightened and safety nets much weaker than at home. 
Children need the protection, guidance and love of caring adults in order to 
develop well. Because of the relative vulnerability of children under 18 years 
 33
of age, it makes intuitive sense to conclude that they are better off working in 
their home community until they get a bit older – although this admittedly is a 
simplistic stand, and disputable in many individual cases.  
 
The three central hypotheses of the Bhalotra-Tzannatos theory are referred to as 
incentive, constraint and agency. In the context of child labor migration this 
would mean: First, the incentive to send a child away to work would be that 
the net returns to working away are better than both the returns to schooling 
and the returns to staying around (working) in the local community. Second, 
poverty constraints being binding could lead to an early expulsion of children 
who can no longer be fed by the parental household (even counting the salary 
they could make working in the local community). In this situation the 
household can not afford to consider the (long-term) incentives to schooling. 
While both these hypotheses assume parental altruism to some degree, the third 
hypothesis raises the doubt: if parental agency is less than fully altruistic, 
children may be sent away to work for the short-term benefit of parents or the 
extended family who are neither forced by constraints, nor place the returns to 
the child at the top of their priority list.27 In this thesis altruism should, 
according to Hamiltons Rule, have a stronger relative importance compared to 
previous studies since only biological children are considered.  
 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) underscore that child labor participation rates in 
reality will be decided by some combination of these three factors. The relative 
weight of each one is important, because the policy implications are different. 
If incentives to schooling are low compared to incentives to work, education 
policy interventions could affect its relative importance. If poverty constraints 
are binding, social policy and perhaps emergency interventions would be 
appropriate. If parents indeed are found to exploit their children (at least to 
some degree), legal regulations should be considered, or, as a cheaper and 
easier to enforce alternative; compulsory schooling should be considered 
introduced (Basu (1999)).  
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The same considerations are relevant for the child labor migration choice. If the 
incentives to labor migrate are stronger than incentives to go to school (or stay 
home and work), educational options should be scrutinized. If child labor 
migration is indeed related to crisis fostering, social protection measures are 
necessary. While if parents have other interests in mind above the welfare of 
their children, legal interventions or sanctions of some sort would be 
adequate.28  
 
2.2.2 Other important factors 
A factor that could help relax poverty constraints is access to credit. Credit can 
notably affect the child labor choice in two ways. Bhalotra and Tzannatos 
(2003) point to the most obvious one: available credit could help get a poor 
family out of a situation of temporary binding constraints, and prevent the use 
of desperate measures like the dis-saving of human capital.29 However, capital 
(including credit) will in a poor rural setting typically be converted into 
productive assets. In a situation of previous un- and underemployment this 
probably also means a new child labor demand at home and increased 
opportunity costs to schooling.30 Bhalotra and Heady (2001) explore an 
interesting twist to this situation: in a situation of credit market failure, asset 
rich households would compete well for the limited credit that is available 
because assets serve as collateral. Moreover, since interest rates vary with 
collateral, asset-rich households would get more attractive credit conditions and 
therefore be more likely to borrow. If these are indeed also the households with 
more child labor, credit constraint would lead to a targeting of the households 
with the greatest child labor problems and, remarkably, target the problem well. 
 
While the three basis hypotheses would produce a relatively simple core model, 
some additional factors interact with them. For example, credit access has 
limited effect if the desperately poor are not aware that it is available to them or 
know how to apply for it. It is important to have access to and ability to 
understand, internalize and utilize information about incentives, as well as 
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alternative options to cope with crisis other than sending the children away. 
Attitudes and behavior, and thus perceived altruism, are clearly also affected by 
information level. Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) do not specifically mention 
information. It is however relatively easy to extend the model with variables 
indicating both community information access and (adult) capabilities for 
understanding and acting upon information and opportunities.  
 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) mention in particular that child labor and school 
participation are also affected by demand side factors. If school is not an 
option and there is no local child labor demand that would give at least a 
minimal return, a demand for children’s labor surely exists at least in some 
other place. For the basic child labor equation, Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) 
suggest modeling in region fixed effects or e.g. regional unemployment rates to 
represent local labor demand.  
 
In the analysis of child labor migration, challenges are different. While a high 
local labor demand should increase the likelihood that children stay to work in 
their home community, it should then simultaneously reduce the relative 
attractiveness of the incentives to the two other options; schooling and labor 
migration. Beyond that, identifying demand side factors in the migration 
destination sites would often be difficult. Child labor migration flows typically 
go towards multiple destinations, and identifying demand side factors in the 
various destination sites would probably prove difficult and complicate the 
model beyond what’s reasonable. The importance of such (statistically omitted) 
demand side factors in the destination sites, however, should be undisputable 
and kept in mind when interpreting the analysis results.31  
 
As economists, Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) generally do not discuss non-
economic explanatory factors, but they include controls for cultural variation. 
Since most econometric models aiming to explain child labor seem to have 
more limited explanatory power than models explaining the schooling choice, 
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there is reason to believe that something is missing. They mention briefly that 
incentives can be of non-economic character – that work can be satisfying, 
social and rewarding in itself. But there may also be other types of non-
economic rewards to child labor migration. Notably, while sending children 
away to work may sound terrible to most, it might sound quite tempting in 
itself to get away from the heavy, dirty, repetitive agricultural labor in high 
temperatures in the Beninese country side – in particular to the more 
adventurous children.32 Moreover, traveling may mean freedom in the sense of 
getting away from strict parental control, as well as getting to control own 
income. Alongside being exciting, traveling may be educational, and also add 
a status to the returning traveler of someone who has “seen the world”. Like 
Thorsen (2005), Castle and Diarra (2002) claim that labor migration from Mali 
to Cote d’Ivoire in many cases may serve as a “rite of passage”. Sometimes 
only very meager earnings are brought back, and/or the earnings are rapidly 
wasted on status symbols and consumables. However, “having been out there” 
adds a social status or prestige and may in turn improve the travelers’ 
opportunity to influence local decisions.33  
 
Finally, opportunity matters. Two households or communities may face similar 
incentives, constraints and agency conditions. Nevertheless, migration is likely 
to be higher from a household with extensive social networks than from one 
with limited ones. Such networks are crucial for information about 
opportunities and terms, but also for reducing migration risks and providing 
some sort of a social safety net at the destination site. This is usually the case 
for chain migrations: the first (often adult) migrants pave the way for those 
who want to follow. They can communicate their experiences in their home 
communities, help broker labor agreements, facilitate travel, and that way 
reduce both risks and relocation costs.  
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3. Method 
 
“A striking feature of available research [on child labor] is the sheer 
variety of results that it has produced. […] We argue that the neglect 
of statistical issues such as endogeneity, measurement error and 
aggregation error has biased the results of a number of studies.” 
 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003:Abstract) 
 
 
This chapter develops a methodological approach to testing the theory of child 
labor migration presented in chapter 2. Beginning with a brief presentation of 
the dataset that will be used, it moves on to define the dependent variables of 
the analysis. The theory can be disentangled into five components, each one to 
be operationalized by the independent variables in this regression. Special 
attention is paid to the particular challenges of regressing child labor on 
measurements of household wealth. The chapter concludes with suggesting an 
appropriate regression model for the task. 
 
 
3.1 The dataset 
 
The empirical data applied in this analysis is unique. It was collected in 2000 as 
part of the World Bank’s preparatory work preceding the development of a 
social protection strategy for Benin, and was designed with the particular 
purpose of quantifying child relocation, identifying risk areas and risk factors. 
The main justification for a household survey of this magnitude was a serious 
concern that trafficking in children had developed dramatically over the 
previous years. In spite of being deliberately designed to study child relocation, 
the available variables are less than perfectly suitable for the purposes of this 
study. Yet, the survey is probably the best existing dataset for such an analysis.  
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The data collection itself was commissioned to a local NGO (Carrefour 
d’Ecoute et d’Orientation, CEO) with practical experience in returning and 
socially reinserting children who had been intercepted by the police at the 
Beninese frontiers, and that thus had a considerable field network. The data 
collection strategy and tools were developed in collaboration between this 
NGO, a representative from the central statistical agency in Benin, INSAE, and 
World Bank staff and consultants.  
 
Most household surveys count only in-living members of a household 
(including foster children) and are therefore not suitable to assess the out-
fostering/out-flux of children based on features of the household of origin. This 
survey, in comparison, starts out with the mother and focuses on the 
whereabouts of all children she has given birth to. The final dataset contains 
information on 19 135 children 0-18 years old, provided by 6 510 mothers 
coming from 4 722 different rural households.34 In the analysis, the 0-5-year-
olds have been removed since they are not eligible for schooling, and 13 324 
cases then remain in the dataset.  
 
 
3.2 Operationalizing the dependent variables 
 
The crucial dependent variable in this analysis is the choice of child labor 
migration. This choice will be contrasted with the schooling choice, assuming 
that the former is the most unfortunate and the latter the preferable one. This 
implies the assumption of three possible outcomes: migration to work, 
schooling and “neither”. The “neither” group serves as a reference category in 
the model. Section 3.2.4 will argue that it is reasonable to treat the reference 
category as the choice of having a child helping out in and around the 
household or working in the local community. Defining this group as a 
reference category makes sense since helping around the household is the 
natural point of departure for most 6-year-olds in rural Benin. They can then 
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either continue doing that, have their prospects improved by being sent to 
school, or become exposed to the risks of being sent away to work. (These 
normative considerations are admittedly simplistic, but consistent with the 
argument in section 2.2.1.)  
 
Throughout this section references will be made to analyses of the primary data 
from the time allocation study presented in section 1.1.3 (Enquête Emploi du 
Temps au Bénin (1998)). Where the child migration dataset proves inadequate, 
the UNDP data will guide the search for adequate solutions to definitional 
challenges.  
 
3.2.1 The child migrant 
Before defining the child labor migrant, it should be clarified how a “child 
migrant” can be operationalized by the available data. Three variables are 
helpful: (i) the age of the child, (ii) where the child lives, and (iii) the time of 
departure for those who have left. A child migrant is defined as a child 6-18 
years old who is living outside the district (sous-prefecture35) of the mother’s 
household. This definition applies to 23 percent of the children in the sample 
(N=3080) and has several implications.  
 
First, 18-year-olds are not children according to the UN definition of a child. 
However, more than 90 percent of those who were 18 years old when the 
survey was conducted had left more than a year before, and were therefore 
children at the time of migration. The value of extending the child labor 
migrant sample was considered important enough to keep this group. 
 
Second, defining a “child migrant” as “living outside the region of the mother’s 
household” raises two issues. To begin with, migration is given a geographical 
scope, excluding children living in other villages within the same district. The 
definition is inaccurate even when it comes to distance since children in larger 
districts can be further away than children in small districts and still not qualify 
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as migrants. Similarly, a child in a neighboring village on the other side of a 
district border may be much closer than a child living in the far end of a large 
district but still count as a migrant. In addition, the definition determines the 
mother’s household as “home”, so in cases where the parents are separated the 
child may live with the father and still be regarded a migrant. There are 
practical obstacles in correcting for this problem with the available data since 
mothers are the main informants and only vaguely indicative information exists 
on whether an absent child lives with the father. While it is more common for 
Beninese children of separated parents to stay with the mother than with the 
father, this tendency is less strong in the age groups of this survey. The 
definition is justified, however, by the fact that almost all young children of 
separated parents (0-6 years old) live with their mothers (see table 1.2, section 
1.1.2).36 For them to possibly live with their fathers at a later age assumes a 
movement away from their first home. This study is concerned with the welfare 
consequences of child relocation, and children who have left their mothers to 
stay with their fathers may well be taken good care of. It could however be 
relevant to keep in mind that several studies point to the mother as the most 
important defender of child related consumption, such as schooling (see section 
1.3.3).37 
 
What is known about the presence of the father of the child migrant? In 84 
percent of the cases, he lives in the maternal household. In an additional ten 
percent of the cases the mother is married to the household head, indicating that 
the father (or stepfather) is considered to be the household head, in spite of not 
being permanently present. Some of these ten percent of fathers are probably 
(seasonal) migrants themselves, but the data provides no opportunity to 
distinguish those from the fathers who simply live part-time in another 
household, perhaps with another wife in the same village (polygamy is 
common, and so are multiple households). The last ten percent of migrant 
children have fathers who are neither living in their maternal households, nor 
part time household heads. It is still possible that some of them visit the 
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household from time to time, but one should assume that the likelihood that 
some of these fathers are themselves migrants is relatively high.  
 
Another factor that could indicate the likelihood that the migrant child has in 
fact gone to stay with the father is with whom the child left. Would the 20 
percent of the migrant children who are registered as not having a father 
permanently living in the same household be more likely to have left with a 
relative (presumably the father or a sibling) rather than a stranger or a friend? 
The data shows a striking resemblance between migrant children whose fathers 
live in the maternal household and those who don’t. While 68 percent of the 
former had left with someone regarded as a relative or kinsman, 67 percent of 
the latter had. The share that had left with a complete stranger was also equal 
for the two groups (13.2 versus 13.8 percent). 
 
The motives given for leaving differs between the two groups. While 17 
percent of children who used to live with their fathers had migrated to study, 
this was the case for as much as 27 percent of those with an absent father. This 
should indicate the possibility that at least some had moved to their father’s 
household in order to go to school. 
 
3.2.2 The child labor migrant 
Does the child migrant work? The child migration survey is carried out in the 
child’s village of origin and there is no way to really know. There are however 
some reasonably good indicators in the data. Importantly, the survey asked the 
mothers about the main motive for the child’s relocation. Figure 3.1 shows the 
distribution on the four answer categories for girls and boys.  
 
The figure shows that more boys than girls had left to study, but also to work. 
While many girls had left to marry, a conspicuously high share had left for 
“other reasons” than work, marriage and studies.  
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Figure 3.1: Main motive for migration of girls and boys 6-18 years old.  
 
Girls       Boys 
Work
35%
Marriage
18%
Study
15%
Other
32%
Work
54%
Marriage
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Study
25%
Other
19%
 
 
A second variable of interest is the question of whether the child is currently in 
school. Not surprisingly, children were not necessarily reported to be in school 
in spite of initially having left to study, and having left intending to work did 
not exclude school attendance for some. While 88 percent of those who had left 
to study were attending school, so were nine percent of those who left to work, 
and seven percent of those who had left for other reasons. Only 3 percent of 
those who had left to marry were attending school.  
 
The main welfare concern for working children relates to “child labor”, i.e., 
according to ILO’s definitions, children who work too much and/or in a way 
that harms them.38 The data allows for no exact operationalization of the ILO’s 
labor definition, but a reasonable proxy can be made. To make a strict 
definition of a working child migrant, only those who had left explicitly to 
work should be counted. In order to further enforce the welfare concern, all 
children who were currently attending school in spite of having left to work 
could be excluded from the sample. These children may well be working, but if 
they still have time to go to school the work load is probably not 
overwhelming. The main concern of this thesis is the welfare of the child, and 
going to school is a decent indication that the child is not being entirely 
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neglected and exploited. Nine percent (N=1207) of the children in the sample 
would correspond to this strict definition of a child labor migrant.  
 
There are some fundamental problems related to the strict definition, though. Is 
it really so that all the other children who had left, and who were not in school 
should not be of interest to a child labor study? Or may they in fact also be 
working, but perhaps more often in the informal labor market or doing house 
work? Including also this group in the definition of a child labor migrant risks 
adding noise to the measurement, and therefore demands some good reasons. 
Two such reasons exist.  
 
A most striking finding is that while the child migrants were about 50 - 50 boys 
and girls, the strict definition identify 48 percent of boy migrants as child 
laborers, but only 31 percent of girl migrants. This stands in stark contrast to 
the fact that only 18 percent of girl migrants go to school, while 29 percent of 
boy migrants do. The UNDP data presented in table 3 in section 1.1.3 also 
shows clearly that girls work more than boys, in particular those living away 
from home. Women’s and girls’ work is often not considered to be labor the 
same way as men’s and boys’ work is, and is therefore typically underreported 
in less precise surveys.39  
 
Ninety-seven percent of the girls who had left to marry were not attending 
school. In the UNDP data there are 38 girls under 18 who are married and live 
away from home, and none of them were involved in any school activities on 
the day of reference. Only three had not done any work, while the average 
work day for the group was 8.4 hours. It is therefore reasonable to believe that 
the girls who had left “to marry” were indeed currently enduring the working 
life of African housewives and mothers, a life that tends to be quite labor 
intensive, but typically not considered “labor” since the main share takes part 
outside the formal labor marked.  
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Similarly, a relatively large number of children (particularly girls) had left for 
“other reasons” and also in this category few were in school. “Other reasons” 
tend to related to family issues (Soumonni (2000)). It is for instance common to 
place children with elderly or childless relatives, with a sister or brother who 
has just married, or with other kinsmen. In addition to having a social 
(networking) function, a core motive for this type of placement is an uncovered 
demand for informal child labor in and around the household. Increasingly, 
rural children, most often girls, are also sent to live with unrelated families in 
urban areas whose own children are sent to school, leaving the rural child with 
the typical child labor tasks of the household. This type of child placement is 
often characterized as fostering, but it may conceal a relatively harsh labor 
exploitation of children. While a child in paid domestic servitude will probably 
have been categorized as a child who left intending to work, this gray zone of 
foster care may not have been counted as such.40 As shown in table 3 in section 
1.1.3, non-school children living away from home work much more than non-
school children staying in their rural households. In fact, a previous analysis of 
the UNDP data (made in collaboration with Blunch41) shows that living away 
from parents increased the work day by one hour and 20 minutes – three hours 
and nine minutes for girls living away from their parents and in an urban area 
(controlling for age). 
 
A second and more liberal way to define a child labor migrant by this dataset is 
therefore to count all migrant children who are not presently in school. This 
definition will inevitably come to include children who are relatively well off, 
some who are working just a little while learning a trade and yet others who are 
looking for a job but are currently un- or underemployed (among the latter 
possibly also street children). Yet, this more liberal definition might, compared 
to the first and more conservative one, turn out to be more accurate since girls 
are more properly accounted for. In spite of being likely to do at least some 
work, it is however questionable if all the children who fall under this liberal 
definition of a child labor migrant fulfill the ILO definition of being child 
 45
laborers. Around 18 percent (N=2368) of the children in the sample fall under 
this more liberal definition. In the previous sample only 40 percent of the 
children were girls, while the new sample comprises 55 percent girls, and that 
should better reflect both the gender differences in school participation rates 
and what is found in the time allocation data from UNDP.  
 
3.2.3 The schoolchild  
The second dependent variable in this analysis is school participation. The 
schooling variable is simply defined by whether the child is currently reported 
to be attending school. If the child is a migrant but still attending school he or 
she will be included. Table 3.1 shows that only 12 percent of school children 
are migrants. Among the migrant children 23 percent are attending school, 
compared to 52 percent of children staying at home.  
 
Table 3.1 Schooling and child migration status for children 6 – 18 years. 
Child currently in school  
No Yes 
Total 
Count 4918 5326 10244 
% within “Child migrant” 48.0% 52.0% 100.0% 
% within “School” 67.5% 88.2% 76.9% 
No 
% of Total 36.9% 40.0% 76.9% 
Count 2368 712 3080 
% within “Child migrant” 76.9% 23.1% 100.0% 
% within “School” 32.5% 11.8% 23.1% 
Child migrant  Yes 
% of Total 17.8% 5.3% 23.1% 
 
Going to school does not exclude work. As shown in table 1.3 in section 1.1.3 
rural school children also work, but only half the time that non-school children 
do.  
 
3.2.4 The “neither” child 
With the current definitions of school children and child labor migrants the 
reference category will be constituted by children who are neither migrants nor 
in school, in other words, children who stay at home without going to school. 
While the dataset gives no information about the work activities of these 
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children one can assume that the clear majority of the children in the “neither” 
category will be working, some with long work hours. Analyses of the UNDP 
data show that among rural children 6-18 years old who were not in school, 
eighty-nine percent had undertaken some sort of labor activity on the reference 
day, and that these working children had an average workday of more than 
seven-and-a half-hours (inactive children excluded). It would therefore be 
reasonable to treat the “neither” category as the choice of having a child work 
(or at least at hand) in and around own household.  
 
 
3.3 Defining the independent variables 
 
The theory presented in chapter 2 outlines the core hypotheses that together 
constitute the model for analyzing the child labor migration choice. There are 
five interacting components of the theory: incentive, constraint, agency, 
information and socio-cultural and demographic controls. Methodological 
approaches to measuring the relative impact of each one will be discussed in 
this section, with particular emphasis on the notoriously difficult definition of 
constraint in child labor research.   
 
3.3.1 Incentive 
What does the data tell about the incentives to schooling, local labor at home 
and child labor migration? Ideally, wage information and unemployment rates 
would be available for both local labor markets and labor markets at common 
destination sites, and returns to education could be estimated, for instance by 
discounting age earning curves. In this case these sizes are not known. But the 
data does provide some indicators that have previously been used to proxy at 
least some of the information required (Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003)). For 
instance, the distance from the household to the school is a strong indicator of 
the accessibility of schooling in the first place, and thus incentive. If the nearest 
school is far away, costs of education indisputably will go up and the net 
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returns thereby shrink. In rural communities, local (child) labor demand is 
largely decided by agrarian production, and the relative amount of land 
cultivated is in the data registered as number of plots per household. Because 
children’s work is not restricted to work on the family owned land, this variable 
is aggregated to the average village level, and should then serve as a decent 
measurement of local agricultural labor demand. In about one third of the 
villages there is cash crop production, and this is likely to increase wages and 
thus the incentive to child labor in the home community. In addition, the data 
provides information on cattle holding in the community, and since herding is 
one of the most typical child labor tasks throughout Africa, aggregating the 
share of households with livestock (smallstock not included) at the village level 
gives further information on labor demand. Analysis of the UNDP data shows 
that one of the most time demanding tasks for rural children is to fetch water. 
Whether there is a village pump or water pipe is therefore an important 
indicator of this local child labor demand. Finally, the presence of a local 
market should be considered since markets offer a considerable demand for 
child labor in Africa: children help in the production of subsistence crops for 
local sales, they help in conservation of food products to be sold, they work as 
market vendors, they cook and sell food to the market vendors and their 
costumers, they transport goods to be sold and carry purchased goods for 
buyers.  
 
The main constraint in testing the incentive hypothesis by applying the 
available dataset is, as indicated in the previous chapter, the challenge involved 
in including demand side factors for the multiple destinations toward which 
children migrate. In the case of Benin these include several countries (notably 
Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon and Nigeria), but also several domestic sites (e.g. cotton 
producing areas in the north-east as well as smaller cities and the capitals 
Cotonou and Porto Novo). It can therefore only be established here that an 
external child labor market exists permanently, offering wage salaries that are 
above what can be expected in most rural areas.42 The weaker the local 
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schooling and labor incentives, the more attractive these external labor markets 
should appear, in spite of the obvious risks of labor migration. The data, 
however, contains information of whether the father lives away from the 
household. As mentioned in section 2.1.3, previous migration of relatives and 
kin facilitates chain migration by reducing relocation and installation costs, and 
by making it easier to find both a place to live and a job. In villages where a 
substantial number of fathers live elsewhere this may be an indication of 
migration being common. The share of fathers living elsewhere is thus 
aggregated at the community level and included as an indicator of previous 
migration and thus as an incentive to the relocation of children. 
 
3.3.2 Constraint: Defining wealth 
Are children put to work or even more drastically, sent away to work due to the 
(binding) poverty constraints of the parental household? The dataset does not 
provide information about household income, expenditure nor consumption. 
Such variables are difficult to determine in a reliable way in a poor rural 
African household, where income variability is considerable and barter 
economy is still important. Adding to this challenge, most people would 
hesitate to reveal information of this sort even to their nearest ones, since it is 
highly sensitive in a society where those with resources are at all times 
expected to support the needs of relatives without. Discretion with regards to 
means and resources is therefore widespread.43 In such circumstances 
household wealth is instead often measured by visually assessing the quality of 
the main household building (floor, walls and roof), counting assets (typically 
radio, TV, telephone, fridge etc.), and by household landholdings.  
 
To begin with the last, the data provides information on household ownership 
of land and livestock, as noted in the section on incentives. In addition to being 
potentially endogenous, landholdings and livestock also present another 
implication for child labor research: they are simultaneously an expression of 
wealth and an incentive for more child labor since land is highly labor intensive 
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(assuming imperfect labor markets). A wealth index for use in child labor 
research would thus be distorted if such labor intensive assets were included. In 
this analysis these indicators are considered of more importance to the 
assessment of incentives, and thus used at an aggregate level, as explained in 
the previous section.  
 
The dataset contains the following variables that could be used to construct a 
reasonable wealth index, as there are no strong apparent arguments to include 
them in the regression equation in their own right:  
 
House building characteristics: 
• The quality of the main household building: The main distinction is made 
between houses with a cement floor and those with a dirt floor or similar, 
houses with brick walls, and those made of dried mud or another lighter 
material, and finally those with iron sheet roofs versus those with roofs 
made of less rainproof materials. Having brick walls is the most exclusive 
of the three, and only slightly more than ten percent of the household 
buildings do. Second comes having a cemented floor, something that almost 
half the houses have. Finally, two in three houses have iron sheet roofs.  
• Number of rooms: It is reasonable to believe that a compound with many 
rooms (often as separate building units) in general would be a bigger and 
wealthier compound.  
• Number of children per room: Ideally the number of rooms should be 
divided on the number of residents in the household in order to get a good 
wealth indication. In the absence of an exact number of household members 
in this dataset, the number of children 0-18 per room can be used as a 
proxy.  
 
Facilities: 
• Electricity: in this survey the only house facility that could serve as a good 
indicator of wealth is electric light, since water provision is basically 
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communal in the regions studied. Four percent of the households have 
electricity. 
• Transport means: the survey also asks for means of transportation belonging 
to the household. Only one percent of the households possess a car, while 
16 percent have access to a moped. Almost one in four have a bicycle, 
while 60 percent have neither.  
 
Constructing a wealth index with these indicators is not straightforward. 
Wealth indexes using similar datasets are typically constructed around a simple 
property count or also based on house quality features like the ones available 
here. While a simple house quality index is also a possibility here, there is 
reason to believe that the index could be improved by including also some of 
the other indicators. The main challenge becomes to weigh each factor so that it 
in a reasonable way expresses what share of the index total it deserves. This 
type of decisions must clearly result from some subjective considerations.44  
 
Table 3.2 Indicators and their weight in the wealth index. (Numbers in 
parenthesis show the share of households with a certain index value.) 
 Score 0 Score 1 Score 2 Score 3 
Roof quality  Dirt, straw or other 
inferior roof 
materials (32%) 
Iron sheet (68%)   
Wall quality Dirt, bamboo or 
other inferior wall 
materials (87%) 
 Brick walls 
 (13%) 
 
Floor quality Dirt, wood or other 
inferior floor 
material (57%) 
Cement floors 
(43%) 
  
 
Number of rooms Less than 6 rooms 
(84%) 
6 rooms or more 
(16%) 
  
Rooms per child < 0,5 room per child 
(22%) 
0,5 – 0,9 room per 
child (29%) 
> 1 room per 
child (50%) 
 
Electricity No electricity 
(96%) 
 Household has 
electricity  (4%) 
 
Transport means No vehicle  
(60%) 
Bicycle 
(23%) 
Moped  
 (16%) 
Car 
(1%) 
 
Table 3.2 shows the weight assigned to each indicator in the wealth index. Four 
of the 12 possible points on the index were determined by the quality of the 
main household building. Since having brick walls was clearly more exclusive 
than having iron sheet roof or cemented floors, brick walls gives two of these 
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four points. One point could be achieved for having iron sheet roof and one for 
cemented floors. 
 
An additional 3 points could be achieved for the size of the household 
compound. Size is clearly more interesting relative to the number of habitants 
than what a plain room count would show, but it matters also in itself. The data 
has no perfect information on the total number of household members, so the 
number of children 0- 18 borne in the household – counting both those living in 
and the migrants – was used as a proxy. While 1 point could be achieved for 
having between half-a-room and 1 room per child, an additional point was 
given for having 1 room per child or more. These limits for each score range 
were made by dividing the children into 3 reasonably equal groups.45 In 
addition to the points given for a high rooms-per-child ratio, particularly large 
households were assigned one extra “luxury” point. While having up to 6 
rooms was relatively common, more than that was rare: while as many as 14 
percent of households had 6 rooms, only two percent had more.46   
 
Seven out of the 12 possible points of the index are thus related to the 
household buildings and the compound. The remaining 5 points were based on 
facilities that do not only have value in themselves but that can also be used for 
further income generation.  
 
Electricity is clearly a luxury good, and the most typical way to profit on 
electricity in many parts of rural Africa is by conserving foodstuff for sale or 
produce ice. Electricity can be provided by a generator or a power line. In both 
cases, having access to electricity does not only indicate the capability to cover 
the costs wiring and connecting to local power supply lines or purchasing a 
generator. It also means the ability to pay electricity bills or fuel for the 
generator. Because this is such a strong wealth indication, electricity is given 2 
rather than just one point.  
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Finally, similar to electricity, the access to a motorized vehicle suggests the 
capability to invest, a possible source of income, and the confidence in being 
able to continue to buy gas. While 3 points were awarded households with a car 
(which is very exclusive in rural Benin), two point were given for owning a 
moped. Even a bicycle is a luxury, and households with a bicycle were 
therefore given one point.  
 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of children on the wealth index scores, in percent and 
cumulative percent. 
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Figure 3.2 shows the distribution of children on the various wealth scores. No 
household got 11 or 12 points, only a few score 9 and only 39 children live in 
households with score 10. Almost two in three children live in households with 
scores 0-3, and then the share drops rapidly towards score 7.  
 
3.3.3 Constraint: Wealth measurements and endogeneity  
Assessing the impact of poverty constraints on child labor supply is perhaps the 
most challenging area of child labor research since the variable quite likely is 
endogenous to some extent. There are five ways to relate to this possible 
problem:  
 
First, it is possible to leave the wealth measurement out of the equation all 
together, as done by Grootaert (1998). However, as poverty constraint is of 
central importance to the analysis of both child labor and child labor migration, 
this approach would strongly limit the ability to test most sensible theories.  
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Second, several authors have made attempts of disentangling the share of 
household income stemming from child labor from the adult share (Ray (2000), 
Cartwright (1996)). This is problematic in two ways: (i) the value of the child’s 
contribution is difficult to assess, in particular in rural Africa where most child 
labor is not remunerated and takes place in and around the household, and (ii) 
Bhalotra (2000) presents evidence of adult and child labor supply being jointly 
determined, thus the adult share of household income is not exogenous. As 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) point out (and as mentioned in section 1.3.3) 
what appears to be constraints leading to more child labor may in fact be an 
expression of the limited altruism of parents and guardians. 
 
Third, the wealth indicator could be simplified by turning it into a dummy 
variable indicating whether or not a household falls into the poorest quintile of 
households, and this is also tried by Grootaert (1998). But as Bhalotra and 
Heady (2001) argue, the variable he constructs is still potentially endogenous, 
and in addition considerable information is lost. Ray (2000) creates a dummy 
and subtracts children’s contribution, but does not avoid endogeneity stemming 
from the joint determination of child and adult labor supply.  
 
Forth, Bhalotra and Heady (2001) and Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) argue 
that the best option is to instrument the wealth indicator, and that way reduce 
the effect of possible endogenous features. The challenge is, however, to find 
instrument variables that fulfill the basic requirements for a good instrument: 
(i) to explain a substantial share of the wealth score, without (ii) being directly 
correlated with the error term stemming from regressing child labor or child 
labor migration on wealth (Kennedy (2003):p168). This is difficult in child 
labor research since most available variables are neither very good indicators of 
household wealth, nor can lightheartedly be omitted in a child labor (migration) 
equation. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) use community level indicators to 
instrument household consumption: going wage rate for adult agricultural 
workers, the presence of a railway line, a market, electricity and piped water. 
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Others have used the presence of a shop, a post office, an index of land 
inequality etc. None of these indicators are uncontroversial in a child 
labor/child labor migration regression, since they are likely to violate the two 
basic requirements for a good instrument: first, they are not likely to explain 
much of the variation in household wealth, and second, most of them 
potentially represent important incentives and thus correlate directly with the 
child labor versus child labor migration decision. As explained in section 3.3.1, 
a market is a great incentive for child labor since various income earning 
opportunities exist in and around markets. A railway line or station would offer 
income opportunities through sales of food stuff and porting – and would 
moreover be a way out and an inspiration to aspiring migrants. Piped water has 
a strong impact on fetching water, which is one of the most time-demanding 
child labor tasks in rural Africa.47 If child and adult labor supply are indeed 
jointly determined, adult wage rates should be of direct concern to the child 
labor decision. In the dataset there is also available information on local health 
institutions, organizations, information sources, and other infrastructure. 
Common to them is, however, that even though they may contribute to explain 
some of the local wealth variation, they would not be very strongly correlated. 
Moreover, many cannot and should not be omitted in the regression equation. 
On top of this, the inherent weakness of using community level instruments is, 
as stressed by Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003:p22), that they inevitably will 
reflect inter-village variation and lead to a loss of information on intra-village 
differences. 
 
The fifth and last option is to leave the wealth indicator in the regression and 
accept that it may lead to a potential upward bias in its coefficient. While 
endogeneity is clearly an element of concern in child labor research, is it 
equally so in the study of child labor migration? Two questions are essential in 
exploring this issue. First: is it as easy for the parents to control the revenue of 
child labor when the child lives away from home, and second, was the child 
migrant a net-consumer or a net-contributor to the parental household before 
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departure? There are no clear answers to either question, but some deliberations 
can be made. To start with the last question: In poor rural households, children 
gradually move from being net-consumers to become net-contributors to the 
parental household. At what age the transition happens of course varies, but the 
poorer the household, the earlier the transition is likely to take place. In the 
context of child labor migration, children are probably more likely to leave 
home when they are close to or passed the transition stage. The preferences of 
parents and children may divert at this point: parents may be more interested in 
promoting the labor migration of children who can not contribute much to the 
household economy while staying where they are, while children may try to 
affect the bargaining game in the opposite direction: as they realize their own 
income earning potential they may be increasingly interested in getting to a 
situation where they can also get to control more of their own earnings.  
 
Who controls the income of the child labor migrant? While the working 
children who live in their parental households in rural Benin are unlikely to 
gain complete control over the profit of their own labor, child labor migrants 
are quite a heterogeneous group with a much less straightforward financial 
relationship to the parental household. Child labor migrants can be divided into 
seven categories: (i) children who emancipated early and have left to start their 
own individual lives and households (including those who left to marry); (ii) 
girls out earning their dowry (including many child domestics), and in certain 
areas boys earning for the bridal price; (iii) children working for free for 
relatives and kin; (iv) street children and unemployed children who live on a 
day-to-day survival basis; (v) children on rite of passage or seasonal migration 
who may or may not contribute to their parental households upon return 
(typical for agricultural laborers); (vi) children who send small amounts of 
money home every month to support their parents (e.g., some child domestics); 
and (vii) children in apprenticeship arrangements. The first four groups are not 
of much concern, since there is not likely to be transfers from these children to 
the parental household. Groups (v) and (vi), on the other hand, are problematic. 
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Unfortunately it is impossible to know from the data how many children there 
are of each kind.  
 
As discussed, there is a second aspect of endogeneity related to children 
working away from home: The children in the first six groups may have 
relieved the parental household of the burden of supporting them. This 
assumption however depends on whether they were all net consumers in the 
parental household in the first place. While many of the youngest labor 
migrants probably were, the length of the work day of older children who are 
not attending school suggests that many were also net contributors. If a 
household in addition has many elderly members, the younger will shoulder a 
larger relative share of the support burden.  
 
Finally, many of the children in group (vii) are likely to remain consumers in 
the parental household economy also after departure. In Benin, a common 
alternative to formal education is to send children away to live with a craftsman 
in order learn a trade by working.48 This informal apprenticeship arrangement 
is in many cases highly exploitative, and has been a main concern of the ILO. 
Moreover, the parents pay for the tools, sometimes for training, food and 
lodging, and on top of this a so-called “liberation fee” is required when the 
term of apprenticeship is over and the child is ready to start his or her own 
business. Since these apprentices are not likely to be registered as “in school”, 
this group will – and rightfully so – have been captured by the definition of a 
child labor migrant.  
 
Table 1.3 showed that rural school children contribute to their household with 
an average of two-and-a-half hours of work daily, while consuming food, 
school fees and possibly other household resources. Children who are at home 
but not in school contribute on average with five hours of work daily, and do 
not consume school fees. While the latter are clearly the ones biasing the 
wealth indicator the most, their work day is relatively short, and the returns to 
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their work are likely to be meager in a rural setting. It is more difficult to assess 
the relative impact of the child migration versus the schooling choice to the 
household economy since the net benefit to the household is so unpredictable in 
the former case.  
 
Will the poorest households benefit more, relatively speaking, from their child 
labor migrants? Poor households may be more likely to request financial help 
from their children, and to search for types of labor migration that lead to 
income transfers to the household. Better off households may have the freedom 
to evaluate the different incentives to the various child labor migration options 
and perhaps be in a position to choose options that give long-term benefits 
rather than short-term return (e.g., apprenticeship investments or strategic 
fostering to strengthen kinship ties and thus the households informal insurance 
arrangements). The reverse may also be true. A household in crisis that can no 
longer support its children is in no position to negotiate the fostering conditions 
of a child. Such a household is also likely to be resource poor and thus have 
fewer choices of alternative migration arrangements. Households in less 
desperate circumstances can afford waiting until a good offer comes along, and 
to negotiate its terms. Such a household would also be able to invest in the 
relocation of the child to a labor market further away where returns are higher 
(probably Gabon or Cote d’Ivoire). In such cases, the better off households will 
benefit more from their migrant children, and wealth differences would thus be 
strengthened instead of weakened.   
 
There is a variable in the dataset that could perhaps give at least an indication 
of the economic effects of having a child labor migrant in the family: The 
survey asked when the child had left. If a child labor migrant contributes to 
improving the family economy, it could be argued that the economy should be 
gradually better for each year the child contributes. In other words, the longer 
the child has been away, the better the family economy. By regressing wealth 
on time the child labor migrants has been away, controlling for age, it becomes 
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clear that the correlation between the two is indeed weak as well as statistically 
insignificant. 
 
Household wealth is a critical variable to child labor theory, and also to the 
theory of child labor migration. But it is challenging to assess its impact given 
the likelihood of endogeneity. The choice here is between four options, each 
with its problems: (i) leaving it out; (ii) ignoring the joint decision of adult and 
child labor supply and try to subtract an estimate of what could be the child 
labor migrant’s income share from the wealth indicator (an exercise that is not 
very likely to be accurate in this case); (iii) instrument the wealth indicator 
using poor instruments that explain only a marginal share of wealth variation 
and in addition are correlated with the error term, or eventually; (iv) leaving it 
in, recognizing the possible upwards bias produced by endogeneity. The last 
option is chosen based on the discussion in this section. By making this choice 
it is explicitly recognized that the particular wealth index created might be 
vulnerable to endogeneity in individual cases. Notably, it is common to pay 
agricultural child workers in kind, often with a bicycle.49 The bicycle counted 
in the wealth index could thus in some cases be the wages of a previous 
seasonal child migration. The monthly contributions from a child domestic 
servant in a city could potentially be spent by a parent (perhaps not very 
altruistic) on gas for the moped, while the salary brought home from a cocoa 
harvest season in the Cote d’Ivoire by a loyal child could have been spent on 
upgrading the house with an iron sheet roof. The wealth indicator needs to stay, 
and the main issue remains to interpret the findings with the potential bias in 
mind.  
 
3.3.4 Factors affecting constraint 
Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003) refer to credit availability as an important 
mitigating factor for relaxing (binding) household constraints. The data 
provides information on the most accessible credit for women in the 
community. The most common place to get credit is the so called “tontine”, an 
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informal rotating saving and credit arrangement organized by small groups of 
women (rated as most available in 49 percent of communities).50 The more 
organized villages may have community funds available (most available in 11 
percent of communities), but these are only found in villages of the three upper 
wealth quintiles. Only 18 percent of communities have more formalized access 
to credit, in Benin in the form of local branches of a savings and loan 
cooperative called “CLCAM”. Twenty-two percent of communities have no 
access to credit. The three types of credit are qualitatively different, and it 
would therefore make sense to test the impact of all three. The credit variable is 
thus recoded into three dummy variables: Tontine, Community fund and 
CLCAM. 
 
Family size and composition could be important elements in assessing 
household constraints, with overall wealth held constant. Again, however, child 
labor research faces problems of endogeneity related to indicators of household 
size and composition, since children’s contributions in and around the 
household must be assumed to encourage fertility. Bhalotra and Heady (2001) 
recognize this, but still leave various indicators related to household size and 
composition in their regression. Cigno, Rosati and Tzannatos (2000), decide to 
leave it out for the same reason. While child labor migration most likely is 
provoked by high fertility, there is perhaps an even greater reason to fear that 
the migration of children encourages parents to have more children. In fact, the 
early “emancipation” of children frees up space and (if the child was a net 
consumer) resources, and in addition some migrant children send money home. 
Moreover, it is likely that a family that has early expulsion of children as a 
strategy will decide to have more children to ensure that the typical child labor 
tasks in and around the household will continue to be taken care of when an 
older child leaves.  
 
High fertility no doubt provokes child labor migration, both due to resource 
constraints and due to the fact that limited land only can be divided on one or a 
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few inheritors. A child rich household is moreover likely to encourage the 
spread of children on professions as well as geographical areas as part of a joint 
household portfolio management strategy, and thus a risk mitigation effort. In 
spite of this, the risk of endogeneity is in this case so obvious that indicators of 
household composition and size are left out. This is also where the following 
analysis differs from several earlier child labor studies, but it should be 
consistent with the well documented deliberations explained by others, such as 
Rosati and Tzannatos (2003). 
 
3.3.5 Agency 
Beyond income, it is difficult to assess parental altruism directly by the data at 
hand. It should be possible, however, to detect some variations in household 
behavior based on variations in the features of the child’s agents. The (relative) 
age of the mother and of the father/household head have been used as such 
indicators, and so have the mother’s and father’s education level. Very few 
mothers are educated at all: only 9 percent have attended primary school and 
only 2 percent higher than that. Mother’s education is therefore given scores 
from 0 – 2 points. Thirty-two percent of fathers are educated, and scores 0-4 
are given to distinguish no education from primary, secondary part one, 
secondary part two and higher education. With household wealth held constant, 
it is also interesting to look at the effects of having a female household head, 
although this may also, as pointed out by Bhalotra and Heady (2001), serve as 
an indicator of household vulnerability beyond wealth (see section 1.3.3).51 
Finally, some authors have proposed to include the rank of the child in the 
child labor equation, suggesting that the first borne is given preferential 
treatment.52   
 
It is complicated to interpret findings on altruism indicators since one can not 
expect that the exact western definition of altruism is shared by Beninese 
peasants. While school is generally perceived as good, one cannot exclude the 
possibility that at least some types of child labor and child labor migration are 
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similarly perceived as privileges – which one being the greatest depends on the 
local incentive structure.  
 
3.3.6 Information 
Does ignorance play a role? Are there any good and accessible information 
sources in the village, and to what extent do parents know how to utilize the 
resources and information at hand? Information about opportunities and 
incentives, as well as capacity to use information to make rational decisions 
and cover own needs are factors that interact with incentives and constraints. A 
local language community radio is a good indicator of information access, in 
particular in rural Benin where NGO and Government programs frequently use 
local radio broadcasting to sensitize the population on core development issues 
like the dangers of AIDS, the health benefits of good hygiene, the virtue of 
saving and investing, the importance of schooling and the dangers of child 
labor, trafficking and child fostering.  Also, the indicators for both parental age 
and education must be seen as proxies to the ability of parents to understand 
and utilize available resources and information. 
 
3.3.7 Socio-cultural and demographic factors 
To account for cultural differences, variables for religion and zone are 
included. While ethnic group is often used to control for cultural differences, 
these are so many and varied in Benin that it might confuse the equation.53 
Instead, variables for being an Animist or a Muslim are included, keeping 
Christians as reference group. Similarly, dummies for the geographical zones 
Central and North are included, keeping the South as reference group.54  The 
zone variables are also likely to catch differences in communication, 
production, and demography that are not accounted for elsewhere.  
 
Child age is included and so is age squared in order to capture the likelihood of 
a non-linear relationship between age and child labor migration and schooling. 
It is of course difficult to interpret the coefficient for the quadratic of age in a 
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multinomial logit model, since the model does not assume a linear relationship 
between the variables. Most studies still include the variable also when 
applying the logit model. 
 
Gender is an important dimension in child labor research, in fact, so important 
that different regressions should be run for boys and girls. 
 
 
3.4 Regression model 
 
Economists have used several limited variable models in their empirical 
analysis of child labor (and schooling) choices: univariate and bivariate probit, 
multinomial logit and tobit. The multinomial logit is this far the most 
commonly applied model, in spite of its basic assumption of independence of 
irrelevant alternatives (Grootaert (1998:p33)). The multinomial probit, on the 
other hand, is restricted by the model being capable of handling only a small 
number of alternatives (Grootaert and Patrinos (1999:p5)). The probit model 
moreover predicts best when the outcome distribution is fifty-fifty, and 
therefore consistently under-predicts the incidence of child labor where it is 
less common (Blunch and Verner (2000:p14, footnote 8)) Grootaert (1998) 
suggests using a sequential probit. He argues that this approach, in addition to 
not countering the limitations of the two others, also allows for a variation in 
explanatory variables for each choice. However, it is disputable as pointed out 
by Cockburn (2000:p11), whether one can reasonably assume a given sequence 
of choices. Is schooling always the preferred choice over a combination of 
work and school, then work only and finally working at home or idling? 
Settling with a sequential probit, these assumptions must be accepted, and that 
does to many appear as too simplistic. The multinomial logit thus remains the 
preferred model in child labor research. 
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4. Analysis 
 
 
This chapter presents the empirical analysis of the Benin data, and scrutinizes 
the impact of altering variable values within the main areas of the theory: 
incentives to school and work, poverty constraints and agency related features. 
Table 4.1 presents the descriptive statistics for the data: it summarizes the 
maximum, minimum and mean values of the indicators that are part of the 
regression equation as well as the standard deviations and sample sizes.  
 
Table 4.1 Descriptive statistics for the dependent variables 
  Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation N 
Incentive 
Average number of farms in village .00 3.00 1.8163 .63088 13324 
Cash crop production 0 1 .33 .470 13228 
Share of households with livestock .00 1.00 .5021 .37079 13324 
Village has pump or piped water 0 1 .52 .500 13228 
Village has daily market 0 1 .25 .431 13228 
Share of fathers living away .00 .55 .1617 .13417 13324 
Distance from household to school 1 4 1.54 .916 12562 
Constraint 
Household wealth index 0-12 points 0 10 3.08 1.984 13257 
Credit: 
Tontine 0 1 .49 .500 13324 
Community Fund 0 1 .11 .316 13324 
CLCAM 0 1 .18 .384 13324 
Agency 
Female-headed household 0 1 .12 .322 13324 
Mother's age 17 68 37.03 8.607 13014 
Mother educated  0 2 .13 .387 13324 
Household head age 18 99 48.03 12.694 13199 
Household head education  0 4 .45 .771 13324 
Rank of child (1 is youngest) 1 9 2.23 1.336 13324 
Information 
Local radio 0 1 .11 .311 13228 
Socio-cultural and demographic factors 
Child age 6 18 11.48 3.735 13324 
Child age squared 36 324 145.74 89.677 13324 
Religion: 
Muslim 0 1 .13 .337 13324 
Animist 0 1 .47 .499 13324 
Zone: 
Center 0 1 .25 .436 13324 
North 0 1 .31 .461 13324 
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Table 4.2 shows the regression results. There is an endless number of possible 
value combinations. In order to study the effects of altering the values of the 
indicators that are most importance to the theory, fixed values must be decided 
for the remaining variables. A standard case is therefore defined as a starting 
point: First, the Central region is selected, since this region comes out as the 
area with by far the most child labor migration. As Figure 4.1 shows, 31 
percent of children in the Center is registered as child labor migrants, compared 
to 16 percent in the South and 10 percent in the North. Schooling rates are also 
low, 41 percent, although they are even lower in the North, where only 39 
percent of the children attend school. In the South there is a 52 percent 
schooling rate.  
 
Figure 4.1 Share of children 6-18 who are labor migrants, attending school or 
doing neither. 
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The central region is thus particularly important to target with policy 
interventions. In the Center the majority of families are Animists, so Animism 
is chosen for religion. General mean values are used for most village features, 
as indicated in table 4.1. The standard case child thus lives in a village with the 
following characteristics: an average amount of land per household of 1.816 
plots, no cash crop production, livestock owned by half the households, there is 
piped water or a village pump, but no daily market. Sixteen percent of fathers 
live away from the household, the most available credit option is the tontine, 
and there is no local community radio. The child has one younger sibling, the 
mother is 37 years old and the household head is 48. The mother has no 
education, but the household head has completed primary school. The 
household wealth score is 3 and the distance to school is the average of around 
1 km.   
 65
Table 4.2 Likelihood of being a child labor migrant and a school child for 
boys and girls 6-18 years old. (Multinomial logistic regression)  
  
Child labor migration School 
  Girls Boys Girls Boys 
  Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Intercept -4.550 *** -6.383 *** -2.724 *** -3.541 *** 
Incentive 
Average number of farms/village 0.202  ** 0.016   -0.292 *** -0.049   
Cash crop production 0.210  ** -0.166   -0.211 ** -0.215 *** 
Share of households with livestock -0.232  -0.124   -0.262 ** -0.794 *** 
Village has pump or piped water 0.031  -0.185 * -0.159 ** -0.048   
Village has daily market 0.273 ** -0.006   0.254 *** 0.212 *** 
Share of fathers living away -0.286  0.345   -0.479  2.064 *** 
Distance from household to school -0.042  -0.103 * -0.260 *** -0.285 *** 
Constraint 
Household wealth index  -0.063 *** -0.019   0.146 *** 0.156 *** 
Credit: 
Tontine 0.193   -0.458 *** 0.194  * -0.305 *** 
Community Fund 0.304  * 0.080   0.395 *** 0.004   
CLCAM 0.187   -0.454 *** 0.054   -0.238 ** 
Agency 
Female-headed household -0.190   0.260 * -0.347 *** -0.220 * 
Mother's age -0.010  -0.015 ** 0.010 * 0.007   
Mother educated  0.254 ** 0.159   0.302 *** 0.298 *** 
Household head age -0.005 * -0.005   -0.003  -0.002   
Household head education  -0.006  0.174 ** 0.392 *** 0.403 *** 
Rank of child -0.001   -0.020   -0.017  -0.058 ** 
Information 
Local radio 0.006  -0.726 *** -0.305 ** -0.014   
Socio-cultural and demographic factors 
Child age 0.550 *** 0.934 *** 0.684 *** 0.926 *** 
Child age squared -0.015 *** -0.027 *** -0.034 *** -0.041 *** 
Religion: 
Muslim 0.513 *** 0.326 * 0.113  0.067   
Animist 0.109   -0.179 * -0.413 *** -0.406 *** 
Zone: 
Center 0.563 *** 0.804 *** 0.361 *** -0.409 *** 
North -1.188 *** -1.112 *** -0.275 ** -0.562 *** 
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4.1 Incentive 
 
To what extent do incentives to work in the local community, labor migration 
and schooling affect the decision to send children away to work or to school? 
Indicators of these three types of incentives are considered in the analysis, and 
the results are mixed.  
 
4.1.1 Incentives to work around own households 
According to the UNDP time allocation survey, five types of labor are 
particularly common for rural children: work on subsistence farms and in 
commercial agriculture, herding, fetching water, and work related to local 
markets. Indicators of the labor demand to each one are included in the 
regression.  
 
Looking first at the effect on schooling, the more farm plots there are in the 
village, the less girls go to school, as anticipated, and as found by Nielsen 
(1998) and Cockburn (2000). The effect is quite strong: A ten-year-old in our 
constructed show case situation would have a 68 percent likelihood of being in 
school in villages without farm land, and her school participation rate drops by 
around 9 percent for each additional plot owned per household, to 41 percent in 
villages with an average of 3 plots per household. For a 14-year-old, the effect 
is equivalent. Surprisingly the amount of farm land in the village does not have 
the same impact for boys schooling. It is not statistically significant, and had it 
been, the impact would have been marginal.  
 
If cash crop is grown, however, both boys and girls are less likely to go to 
school. This is consistent with the results of Nkamleu and Kielland (2006) who 
find that additional cash crop land reduces the probability that children are able 
to combine school with work on the cocoa farm, generally reducing the 
schooling probability. Unlike work in subsistence agriculture, cash crop 
production more often means payment in cash, and the marginal return to labor 
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is presumably higher. This is also the likely reason why cash crop production 
serves as a disincentive to schooling in this case. To the ten-year-old girl, the 
probability of going to school drops from 52 to 45 percent if a cash crop is 
grown in the village, for a 14-year-old from 31 to 24 percent. For a 10-year-old 
boy the probability of schooling falls from 59 to 55 percent, for a 14-year-old 
from 41 to 38. While cash crops most often attract boys’ labor, this may not be 
the case for cotton, the most common cash crop in Benin. Harvesting cotton is 
for instance much less heavy than harvesting a male dominated crop like cocoa. 
It is also possible that girls schooling is more vulnerable to alternative 
incentives since boys education traditionally has been considered to be more 
important. Boys’ participation in cash crop production may furthermore make 
it necessary for girls to substitute for boys’ labor in other labor tasks in and 
around the household. 
 
Child labor demand in herding, as indicated by the share of households with 
livestock in the village, also shows the anticipated effect: it reduces school 
participation for both boys and girls. This is consistent with what Canagarajah 
and Coulombe (1998) find for Ghana, but not with Blunch and Verner (2000), 
who find that ownership to cattle and goats increase school participation for 
both boys and girls in spite of also leading to more child labor. As expected, 
the effect is stronger and more systematic for boys, since larger livestock 
predominantly is a male trade. In the case of a 10-year-old boy, the probability 
of going to school drops from 68 percent in a village without livestock to 59 
percent in the average village where about half the households have livestock, 
and to 50 percent in a village where all households have livestock. Impact is 
similar for the 14-year old whose schooling likelihood drops from 50 to 41 to 
32 percent. The impact on girls is more modest. The probability of schooling 
for 10-year-olds drops from 54 percent in the village without livestock to 50 
percent where every household have it, and for the 14-year-old from 32 to 30 
percent. It should be mentioned, however, that cattle in particular is much more 
common within certain ethnic groups is Benin (notably the Fulani), and that 
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these numbers probably to some degree also reflect certain cultural features 
that stand unaccounted for in this regression.55  
 
As mentioned, rural children in Benin spend a lot of time fetching water. It 
was therefore anticipated that piped water or the presence of a village pump 
would reduce the local child labor demand and thus increase schooling. While 
statistically insignificant for boys, the effect for girls goes in the opposite 
direction of what was expected. Contrary to what Cockburne (2000) finds, 
access to a village pump or piped water reduces the probability that girls attend 
school by four percent for both 10 and 14-year-olds. The odd finding might be 
explained by spurious impact from other child labor demanding community 
infrastructure. But it is also possible that the availability of water in the 
community increases the chance that children are used to fetch it. When the 
water source is very far away adults may more often be doing the job.56 A 
similar observation was reported by Draper and Cashdan (1988) with regards to 
children’s participation in hunting and the distance to the hunting field. 
 
The direction and impact of the presence of a daily village market is not as 
expected either. While certainly child labor demanding, the market still 
contributes to an increase in school participation for both boys and girls. It is 
easier to find good explanations in the market case than in the water case. One 
would be that the market represents a community wealth and infrastructure 
level that is unaccounted for by the household wealth index: if there is a daily 
market in the first place, the purchase power of the inhabitants is probably high 
relative to the villages without a (daily) market. In addition, it generates local 
revenue. It is not unlikely that some children use the market as an opportunity 
to earn their own school fees.  
 
How do these five child labor demanding sectors relate to child labor 
migration? The most striking finding is that they are far less relevant in 
explaining child labor migration than schooling. For boys only the availability 
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of piped water or a pump is (barely) statistically significant, and has the 
opposite direction of expected. A 14-year-old boy in a village with piped water 
is 4 percent less likely to be a labor migrant, a 10-year-old two percent less. 
Subsequently it seems that the absence of water facilities may be a push factor 
for labor migration, probably expressing (infrastructural) local poverty more in 
general.57  
 
Three indicators are statistically significant to girls’ labor migration, and none 
of them in the predicted direction. While local farm land, cash crop 
production and daily markets were indeed expected to be child labor 
demanding features that would retain children from labor migration, they all 
have the opposite effect. While the increase in the average number of plots in 
the community had a strong and expected negative impact on girls schooling, 
not all the non-school girls were working on the local farms. In fact, the share 
of girls who migrated increased more than the share of girls who were working 
locally. For 10-year-old girls, the probability of working (or idling) in their 
own local communities increased from 22 to 32 percent when the average 
number of plots per household went from the minimum of 0 to the maximum of 
3. This finding among the younger girls would actually support the “wealth 
paradox”: while farm land represents wealth, it also increases child labor 
demand. However, the wealth paradox will not explain the following findings: 
the probability of 10-year-old girls to be labor migrants goes from 10 to 27 
percent when the amount of land increases from the minimum to the maximum. 
Moreover, for 14-year-olds the impact on local child labor was almost 
disappearing: the probability of working locally only went from 27 to 29 
percent, while the share of girls migrating rockets from 25 to 50 percent. More 
than representing an incentive for local labor, the increasing amount of farm 
land appears to be a strong disincentive for staying, in particular for older 
girls. The predicted probability of enrollment of 6-year-old girls in 
communities without farmland is as high as 61 percent, but only 37 percent in 
communities with the maximum land score. Quite likely will many of the girls 
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who never get to go to school in agriculture intensive villages be highly 
vulnerable to labor migration later on. But moreover, those who did study may 
have few employment options outside farming in such places, and may also opt 
to leave to find the types of work for which they feel qualified.58 Again there is 
a possibility that villages with many plots have social and cultural features that 
encourage the labor migration of girls. It must be assumed that this possibility 
accounts for at least some of the tremendous impact the amount of farm land 
has on girls’ labor migration.59  
 
The impact from cash crop farming is also strong, and stronger on increasing 
the labor migration (of girls) than on local child labor. The 10-year old girl’s 
probability of labor migration increases from 19 to 25 percent if cash crop is 
produced in her community, for the 14-year-old from 40 to 48 percent. The 
reason might be that cash crop farming brings in middlemen and traders from 
urban areas, and that way improve opportunities to find contacts, transport and 
work elsewhere. Increases in local child labor are only marginal, and for 18-
year-olds in fact reversed. The impact of cash crop farming was shown to 
reduce schooling, but is only statistically significant to boys’ labor migration if 
accepting a 15 percent significance level (Sig. 0.116). It would then have the 
anticipated effect, reducing labor migration (marginally) and increasing local 
labor. This would make sense since cash crop farming predominantly is a male 
trade. Most other studies do not include a particular variable for cash crop. 
Nkamleu and Kielland (2006), however, similarly find the amount of 
commercial cocoa farm land not to be statistically significant to the child labor 
participation in cocoa farming.  
 
As mentioned, the daily market increases the school participation of girls, but 
it also increases their labor migration. The probability of girls (only) working 
in the local community is thus strongly reduced when there is a market in the 
village. The conclusion must be that the indicator “daily village market” is 
erroneously defined as an incentive to stay – instead it appears to be an 
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incentive to leave. How can this be? Local markets represent contact with the 
outside world. As was mentioned in the introduction, it is often local traders 
who bring children along from their villages when going to see their trade 
partners in more urban areas. Rumors about opportunities and job offers spread 
quickly in a market place, and the mediation effect cannot be underestimated. 
Finally, as bad as it may sound, many of the young girls working in local 
markets are also “products for sale” themselves, with their mothers and 
kinsmen often mediating their services to clients from outside. Costumers from 
out of town often stop and negotiate when they see a girl they like, or 
deliberately go to villages where they can “shop” for a servant in the local 
market.60 This way markets may strongly facilitate the labor migration of girls: 
they reduce both travel costs and the costs of finding a job, they may 
ameliorate the perception of risks since the mothers may get to meet the 
prospective employers, or alternatively, the mother is more likely to know the 
person acting as an intermediary when he or she is a trader who either belongs 
to the village or visits the village frequently.  
 
In conclusion, children leave in spite of incentives to work in their home 
communities. In a limited variables regression these results may stem from 
failure to include more community level infrastructure variables of relevance, 
making the variables intended as “incentive indicators” bearers of spurious 
effects from conditions unaccounted for. However, it is also possible that many 
of the most common labor demanding sectors in rural areas indeed function 
more as disincentives to stay, given the grueling work conditions they offer – 
like walking long distances to fetch water, or working in dirt and heat on the 
local farms.   
 
4.1.2 Incentives to labor migration 
The analysis results indicate that local markets provide multiple incentives for 
child labor migration, notably for girls. Other incentives facilitating for child 
labor migration have been difficult to define, but it was hypothesized that the 
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share of fathers who were absent from a community’s households could 
indicate whether many fathers from a village were already migrants. If many 
fathers are migrants, it is logical to assume that they make chain migration 
easier because they can facilitate both travel and job search, and that way 
reduce relocation costs.  
 
The findings do not support this hypothesis. While Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998) found that the father being absent from the household led to more work 
and less schooling for the household children, the share of absent fathers in this 
analysis instead drastically increases the probability that boys go to school. The 
probability of enrollment of a 6-year-old boy increases from 33 to 61 percent 
when the share of absent fathers increase from 0 to 55 percent, the minimum 
and the maximum values of the villages sampled. For a 10-year-old the 
probability goes from 52 to 76 percent and for a 14-year-old from 34 to 58 
percent. While this could of course be interpreted as a possible sign of maternal 
altruism, a different possibility must also be considered: if the absent fathers 
are indeed overwhelmingly labor migrants their transfers may help support 
boys’ schooling (given the likelihood that the equation’s wealth measurement 
does not fully capture all aspects of household income). Also, migrants may 
better understand the value of education, and therefore try to ensure that their 
sons are better prepared if they should choose to migrate later on.61 The fact 
that many communities throughout Africa are largely funded by such transfers 
is well known: the most striking finding is perhaps that it so clearly favors 
boys.  
 
A notable difference between the data used by Canagarajah and Coulombe 
(1998) and this study is that the schooling definition in this analysis also 
includes children who live away from the maternal household while going to 
school. As stressed in section 3.2.1 the share of children who had migrated to 
study was much higher among those living in households without a father than 
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those with. This suggests that they might have moved to the fathers’ new 
household precisely to attend a school in his community.  
 
4.1.3 Incentives to schooling 
The analysis quite predictably shows that the distance between household and 
school is strongly related to the likelihood of school participation of both boys 
and girls. Similar findings were made by Nielsen (1998), Canagarajah and 
Coulombe (1998), and Grootaert (1998). Figure 4.2 shows the reduction in 
school participation when the distance to school increases from the shortest 
(score 1) in the sample to the longest (score 4). The likelihood of school 
attendance drops from 50 to 32 percent – that is by 36 percent – for the 
youngest girls, and over 40 percent for the youngest boys. For 10-year olds 
participation likelihood drops by around 30 percent for both, while the impact 
is strengthened by age, particularly for girls, whose schooling likelihood is 
reduced to the half from age 14 on.  
 
Figure 4.2 Predicted reduction in probability of school attendance for girls 
and boys by age when school distance is increased from less than one 
kilometer to more than two kilometers. 
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Again the impact on child labor migration is weak and only statistically 
significant for boys. Instead of increasing the relative importance of incentives 
to labor migration, the long distance to school also reduces the likelihood to 
leave altogether. In other words, children who live far away from school are 
more likely to stay and possibly work in and around their own households. 
(Coulombe (1998) and Nielsen (1998) both found that distance to school 
increases child labor, while some of Grootaerts (1998) findings can be 
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interpreted the same way.) Similar to those living in a community without 
regular markets, people who live in remote areas may have weaker networks 
and les information about migration options, and thus higher relocation costs. 
 
 
4.2 Constraint 
 
Do parents send their children on labor migration as a response to household 
poverty? The results of the analysis are not entirely in line with the hypothesis 
on constraint, and encourage further investigation. 
 
4.2.1 Wealth 
The wealth index shows the anticipated impact on both child labor migration 
and schooling by reducing the former and increasing the latter. But household 
wealth is far from being statistically significant in the case of boys’ labor 
migration. Figure 4.3 shows the probability of schooling, labor migration and 
“neither” for children with different household wealth scores, grouped by age. 
Notably, the charts must be read keeping in mind that the impact shown on 
boys’ labor migration is highly insecure. 
 
Looking first at the 6-year-olds, school start for the youngest appears to be 
strongly influenced by the household wealth score. School attendance (read 
early enrollment in this case) is more than twice as high for both boys and girls 
with wealth score 10 compared to those with wealth score 0. Even among the 
poorest households, where the majority of children are found, increasing the 
household wealth score by only one point leads to an approximately 10 percent 
increase in the probability of attending school. The probability of labor 
migration is still fairly low in this age group, and for girls it is reduced to a 
quarter of the probability (from 12 to 3 percent) between wealth scores 0 and 
10. The approximate 1 percent drop per additional wealth score represents an
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Figure 4.3 The probability of schooling, labor migration and “neither”, on wealth 
score for boys and girls, segregated on age group.*  
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*NB! The effects on boys’ labor migration are not statistically significant. 
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almost 10 percent reduced probability for labor migration for each wealth score 
added.  
 
School drop-out is striking between ages 10 and 14, in particular among the 
poorest, and slightly more for girls. While school participation rates for the 
wealthiest boys drop by 13 percent in the four year period, the same effect for 
girls is a 17 percent drop. Among the poorest, both girls and boys school 
participation rates drop by 18 percent. Since school participation is generally 
lower for girls and the poor this means a stronger impact of poverty on school 
drop-out for these groups. Poor girls are particularly vulnerable as their school 
participation is halved between 10 and 14 years of age. Among the 14-year-
olds three times as many girls are in school in the wealth score 10 group than in 
the wealth score 0 group.  
 
The likelihood for 10-year-old girls to be on labor migration is already more 
than double of the 6-year-olds, and accelerates towards 50 percent for the 
poorest girls by age 14. The probability of being a labor migrant drops by about 
3 percent per wealth score among the poorest households (scores 0-3), then by 
2 percent for households between score 3 and 8, and one percent among the 
wealthiest. The drop per wealth score again represents about a 10 percent 
reduced probability of being a labor migrant.  
 
Very few among the poorest 18-year-olds are in school. Even among the 
wealthiest in the sample, less than 30 percent of the boys and slightly more 
than 20 percent of the girls still study. As the figure shows, the impact of 
wealth on schooling in this age group is considerable, quadrupling the number 
of male students between wealth score 0 and 10, while the number of female 
students is more than five times higher.  
 
By age 18 labor migration rates are suddenly much higher in the wealthiest 
households, while at earlier ages it remained fairly low. In other words, there 
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appears to be a lag in labor migration caused by wealth – the wealthier still 
leave, but tend to leave when they become older, presumably after many of 
them have completed secondary school.  
 
Overall, the impact of wealth on the schooling choice is stronger and more 
distinct than on the child labor migration choice. The fact that wealth was not 
statistically significant for the choice of boys’ labor migration suggests that 
whether a boy works around his own household or somewhere else is for many 
not primarily a question of constraint. Girls, on the other hand, become more 
systematically vulnerable to being sent away to work when household poverty 
increases, in particular around 14 years of age. The results suggest that there 
may be great qualitative differences between the various types of labor 
migration listed in section 3.3.3. Boys’ labor migration may have more of an 
educational value, while for girls it may be more likely to represent crisis 
coping. Girls therefore seem more vulnerable to be “sacrificed” in times of 
crisis.  
 
4.2.2 Credit  
The impact of three types of credits were tested in the analysis: the informal 
tontine, the community funds and the most formalized credit arrangement 
CLCAM. The survey asks which form is most accessible to women in the 
village. It is therefore important to keep in mind that having better access to a 
community fund does not exclude the possibility that several other credit forms 
may coexist but be less accessible.  
 
Nielsen (1998) found that formal credit generally had no impact on schooling 
but helped reduce child labor for both boys and girls. Informal credit showed 
no significant impact in the rural sub-sample, but in the gender segregated sub-
samples also informal credit reduces child labor for both boys and girls. She 
also found that informal credit contributed to reduce the schooling of boys – a 
surprising finding that is confirmed in the following analysis.   
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All three credit forms seem positively related to the labor migration of girls and 
in general negatively related to the labor migration of boys. The results, 
however, are only statistically significant in the case of the community fund for 
girls (positive), and the tontine and CLCAM for boys (negative). The impact on 
schooling is paradoxically similar: credits impact positively on girls schooling, 
but negatively on boys. CLCAM is not statistically significant for girls 
schooling, and community funds not for boys. This all indicate that the three 
credit forms have slightly different functions in the villages, and that their 
effects on relaxing poverty constraints are different for boys and girls: While 
increasing the share of boys working in and around their own households, they 
reduce the share of girls who do so.  
 
Figure 4.4 shows reductions in probabilities within the group of all boys or all 
girls in the sample. Note that the text in the following paragraphs will refer to 
the percentage reduction within the group of boys or girls who migrate or 
within the group of school boys or school girls to give a better picture of the 
relative impact per age.  
 
The tontine is statistically significant in reducing a boy’s probability of being a 
labor migrant, but also reduces his probability of being in school, as shown in 
figure 4.4 chart A. The reduction in labor migration is of about one fifth for the 
youngest boys, and gradually decreases towards a 12 percent reduction for the 
oldest boys. Reduction in school attendance is more modest, of around 15 
percent for the youngest boys, while the effect slowly disappears between 12 
and 14 years of age and remains zero for the older age groups (figure 4.4 chart 
B). The 6 to 8-year-old girls’ probability of schooling on the other hand 
increases by 7 to 8 percent, but this relatively modest effect gradually 
disappears towards 18 years of age. One could expect access to credit to be 
more important for the poorest, but the effects found are strikingly similar for 
rich and poor boys (wealth scores 10 versus 0). The only difference worth 
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Figure 4.4 Probability of child labor migration and schooling by age, on 
credit types available. 
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* The tontine was also positively related to girls schooling, but only at a .10 level and with 
moderate effect.  
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mentioning being that the negative impact from the tontine on schooling is 
slightly weaker among the wealthier boys.  
 
The community fund only has an impact on girls, increasing both their labor 
migration and schooling probability. Figure 4.4 chart C shows that the 
increases in probability for girls’ labor migration is relatively modest and 
constant for all age groups at around 10 percent. Schooling is more strongly 
positively affected; it increases girls’ school participation by as much as 18 
percent for the 6-year-olds, and remains around 14 percent higher for the other 
age groups as well (figure 4.4 chart D).  
 
Comparing the impact of the community fund for rich and poor households, 
results show that it is mainly the poorest households that are negatively 
affected with regards to girls’ labor migration. Only among wealthy 16 to 18-
year-olds a slight increase in the probability of labor migration can be found. 
The positive impact of community funds on schooling is also stronger among 
the poor: a poor 8-year-old girl for instance faces a 16 percent reduced 
likelihood of attending school in a village without community fund, while a 
rich 8-year-old only faces a 7 percent reduction.  
 
CLCAM, the most formalized form of credit, is only statistically significant 
for boys, and the effect is strikingly similar to the impact of the informal 
tontine: for the particular boy in our example the probability of being a labor 
migrant is reduced by one fifth for the two youngest groups, the impact falling 
gradually towards 12 percent for the oldest. The effect on schooling is less 
consistent. While CLCAM appears to reduce the school participation of the 
youngest boys, this effect disappears in the 12 year group, and turns positive 
from about 14 years of age. Similar to the tontine, the effect is about the same 
for wealthy and poor households, the poor boys’ school attendance likelihood 
being slightly more sensitive to the presence of a community fund.  
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In conclusion, the share of boys who work in and around their own households 
increases in villages with the tontine and CLCAM, and this should be 
consistent with the suggestion that credits are invested in productive assets and 
thus increase domestic child labor demand, and therefore again is related to 
incentives. The reduction in boys’ labor migration also signals that credits this 
way may help families avoid sending away boys as a crisis coping mechanism 
in times of dire constraints.  
 
Girls are more vulnerable than boys to be taken out of school in situations of 
(binding) constraints. The tontine or community fund credit help retain girls in 
school during a crisis and help the household get back on its feet without 
necessitating actions that will lead to dis-saving of their human capital. Credit 
however has no desirable effect on reducing girls’ labor migration, and this is 
counter-intuitive since household poverty constraints had such a strong impact 
on their labor migration probability. It is often assumed that credit to women is 
invested in assets or small businesses that require the help of their daughters – 
either in the business itself or in substituting for the woman in her daily 
household tasks. No evidence of this is found, to the contrary.   
 
 
4.3 Agency 
 
The most probable agents of the child’s schooling and labor decision are 
mothers, fathers and/or household heads. How do their individual features and 
relative bargaining power affect the child labor migration and schooling 
decisions, other things held constant? Are mothers indeed more altruistic? 
Similar to what was found by Grootaert (1998), the regression shows that 
children go less to school in female-headed households. For the youngest 
children having a female household head leads to a decrease in school 
attendance by about 14 percent. The impact increases only slightly by age for 
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girls, while the impact for older boys (14-18 years of age) is as much as around 
a 25 percent drop as compared to male-headed households. There is no 
statistical significance of the gender of the household head on girls’ labor 
migration. For boys, however, having a female household head drastically 
increases the probability of labor migration, especially for the youngest ones. 
While a 6-year-old in the standard male-headed household has a likelihood of 
labor migration of 4 percent, the likelihood increases to 6 percent (or by 50 
percent) if the household head is female. For 12-year-olds the increase from 24 
to 32 percent represents a 33 percent increased likelihood, while the effect then 
continues to drop towards age 18.  
 
What is the effect of agent education? The data gives information about the 
education level of the mother and the household head. Both mother’s and 
household head’s education increases school participation probabilities for both 
boys and girls. This makes logical sense and is consistent with Nielsen (1998), 
Coulombe (1998), Canagarajah and Coulombe (1998) and Cockburn (2000). 
Figure 4.5 looks at some variations to the standard household.  
 
Figure 4.5 Schooling probability of 12-year-old boys and girls and primary 
education of parents (in percent): 
46
54
46
51
43
59
53
37
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
Boys Girls
Household head no education,
mother no education
Household head primary, mother
no education
Household head no education,
mother primary
Both primary education
  
Results show the schooling probabilities of 12-year-olds depending on whether 
the agents have primary school (to keep it realistic, higher education is not 
considered here). In relative changes this means that the household head having 
primary education increases the likelihood for the 12-year-old boy of being in 
school by 17 percent, and for the 12-year-old girl by 24 percent. Mother having 
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primary education increases the likelihood of boys schooling by 11 percent and 
girls by 16 percent. Both agents having primary school improves the chance 
that the boy is in school by 28 percent and the girl by 43 percent. Household 
head’s education thus has a stronger impact than the education of the mother, 
and the impact of education of both household head and mother is strongest for 
girls.  
 
The education of the agents also affects the child labor migration probability, 
and with an interesting gender pattern: mother’s education increases the 
likelihood that girls labor migrate, while the education of the household head 
increases the probability that boys do. The effects are relatively small, 
indicating that agent education first and foremost contributes to reduce the 
share of children who work or idle in and around their own households. For the 
boys the effect changes by age: having a household head that has completed 
primary school reduces the labor migration likelihood for the younger boys, 
while the likelihood increases in the oldest age group. Thus it appears that the 
education of the household head leads to a delayed departure for the boys. 
That the education of the household head contributes to reduce the probability 
that children work and idle around their own households would be consistent 
with Nielsen (1998), Cockburn (2000), and Bhalotra and Heady’s (2001) 
findings for boys.  
 
The impact of the age of the agents on children’s schooling is interestingly 
almost non-existent. This was also found by Nkamleu and Kielland (2006), and 
by Couckburn (2000) for boys. For child labor migration, however, the trend is 
contrary to what was found for education. Similarly, while mother’s education 
was found to increase the labor migration of girls, her age is found to reduce 
the labor migration of boys. While the education of the household head was 
found to increase the labor migration of boys, age is found to reduce the labor 
migration of girls. Seeing age and education only as bargaining power is 
obviously simplistic. In fact, the age of the household head may, as suggested 
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by Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003:p49) also be an indicator of the child living in 
an inter-generational household where the child’s grandfather, for instance is 
the household head. In the absence of other household composition variables 
(that were omitted because of the risk of endogeneity), the age of the household 
head may in this equation thus also carry the spurious effects of for instance 
having a high number of household members.  
 
How about the impact? Again the case of 12-year-old boys and girls is 
examined. In the standard case, the mother is 37 years old and the household 
head 48. The impact of altering the age of the household head is negligible, and 
a 10 year reduction only increases the labor migration likelihood of girls by 1 
percent. Altering the mother’s age has a slightly stronger impact on the 
migration likelihood of boys: while a 30-year-old mother gives a labor 
migration likelihood of 27 percent, the son of a 50-year-old mother only has 19 
percent likelihood of labor migrating. If women’s bargaining power is indeed 
increasing by age, this can in fact be interpreted as a sign of maternal altruism 
towards – at least – sons, and if counting effects also at a 15 percent 
significance level also towards her daughters.  
 
In conclusion, the features of the child’s agents do matter for whether children 
labor migrate or go to school, but the effects are not systematic with regards to 
the assumption of women being more altruistic. Women were assumed to have 
a stronger bargaining power when educated, when older and when heading the 
household. Results, however, show that female-headed households have a 
higher propensity to send boys on labor migration. The likelihood of girls’ 
labor migration increases with the mother’s education, while child labor 
migration decreases with mother’s age. The three findings call for individual 
interpretations. While only the last can be taken as an indication of maternal 
altruism, the fact that educated mothers send their daughters away call for 
further investigation. If certain types of labor migration are seen as desirable, it 
is possible that educated mothers have better social networks that can be used 
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to facilitate for the relocation and find the girls (better) jobs at a destination 
site. The tendency of female-headed household to not send children to school 
but send boys on labor migration, other things held constant, could of course be 
caused by limited maternal altruism. However, it could also be due to a relative 
vulnerability of these households, as suggested by Bhalotra and Tzannatos 
(2003:p43). As explained in section 1.3.3 this could be related to both an 
insufficient wealth measurement in the regression and to the other limitations 
placed on female-headed households that are common in traditional societies. 
When both educated household heads and educated mothers have a higher 
propensity to send their children away to work, this does, however, raise a very 
fundamental question: is child labor migration really as bad as suggested by the 
theoretical foundations for this paper? 
 
 
4.4 Information 
 
The regression equation also includes a variable measuring the information 
level in the community. Is ignorance about the risks indeed a reason why 
parents take the chance of sending children away to work?  In the former 
section the positive impact from agent education on child labor migration 
would indicate otherwise.  
 
The presence of a community radio, a media often used for public awareness 
rising, shows a highly gender-biased impact. While strongly reducing the 
probability of boys’ migration, it simultaneously somewhat reduces the school 
participation of girls. In other words, the share of children staying to work or 
idle around their own households increases. The reason for this very uneven 
impact on boys’ and girls’ labor migration deserves further investigation.  
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4.5 Socio-cultural and demographic factors 
 
Not surprisingly, the probability of both schooling and labor migration 
increases by age. Also, this increase is gradually weakened, as shown by the 
negative coefficients for age squared.  
 
The religion and geography variables were mainly included in order to account 
for cultural variations. They also turn out to be very powerful, underscoring the 
variations of the child labor migration phenomenon across the country.  
 
While Muslim children were found to be more likely to labor migrate than 
Christian children, they have about the same probability of going to school, 
controlling for geographical zone (Muslims mainly live in the north). The 
explanation for the high migration probability particularly among Muslim girls 
may be the requirement of bringing a dowry into the marriage. It is common 
for Muslim girls to earn this dowry as domestic servants in the southern cities 
of the country. The labor migration likelihood of a 16-year-old Muslim girl 
coming from the northern region is for instance 22 percent, while a Christian 
girl living in the same region would only have a probability of 15 percent, and 
an Animist girl 18 percent. 
 
The Animist majority shows a much lower likelihood of attending school, 
while Animist boys are also less likely to migrate to work. The majority of 
Animists live in the center of the country (almost 60 percent of the children 
from the center are Animists), and this is also where the highest child labor 
migration figures are found. The fact that religion accounts for so little of this 
variation is interesting in itself.   
 
Geography matters greatly in Benin, and the effect of being born in the central 
zone of the country is, as previously mentioned, very strong. The high labor 
migration figures quoted throughout this chapter are related to the fact that the 
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standard case analyzed in this thesis was placed in exactly this region. So, 
where the child is born combined with religion is extremely decisive for his or 
her destiny. Take a look at the case of the typical child in the South, Center and 
North. The Southern child is typically a Christian. By age 16 a boy has a 26 
percent likelihood of having left home to work, while the girl has a 35 percent 
probability. The Central child is typically Animist and the Animist boy and girl 
in the Center both have a stunning 52 percent likelihood of being labor 
migrants by the time they are 16. The Muslim 16-year-old girl from the North, 
in comparison, has as previously stated a 22 percent probability of having left 
home to work, while the boy has an 18 percent likelihood.  
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5. Conclusions and policy recommendations  
 
 
Demographic figures for most West African countries show that a high share of 
children live away from their parents. Time allocation studies reveal that, when 
not in school, non-biological children of the household head work more than 
the biological children. In addition, many working children do not live in 
regular households at all. They are therefore not accounted for when household 
surveys are used for analyzing the determinants of child labor.  
 
Most earlier empirical research models aiming to explain child labor 
participation are based on household data that include a variable for whether a 
child is the biological child of the household head or not. This may help 
understand the role played by biological ties in determining whether a child 
will work in that particular household, but that’s not the whole story. In fact, 
assuming that the household head is the decision maker on whether a child is to 
work or study is only partially correct. In the case of non-biological children, 
this decision is often made before the child arrives in the household. A smart 
child may be sent to another household to live closer to a school. An 
unfortunate child may be sent away from home to make money as a domestic 
servant. And even a very altruistic household head cannot send a 13-year old 
foster child to school if he or she has never earlier set foot in one. 
 
This thesis concentrates on a particular type of child labor that is seldom 
considered: child labor performed by children who are separated from their 
family and away from their community. It is also different from previous child 
labor studies in that it primarily focuses on the parental decisions on labor and 
schooling, instead of the decision of the household head with which a child 
lives at the time of a survey. In addition, it takes into account all children who 
work away from the parental household in the child labor definition, including 
those that “regular” surveys would not cover, such as children in the street, or 
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working on plantations away from home, or simply living in a household that 
“forgets” to mention them to interviewers  
 
The theoretical approach for the analysis presented is based on three core 
hypotheses used to explain child labor, as presented by Bhalotra and Tzannatos 
(2003). First, the importance of incentives to schooling, work in the local 
community and labor migration were considered. Second, indicators of 
household poverty constraints and the availability of credit that could help 
relax such constraints were analyzed. Third, features of the agents presumed to 
make the decision on behalf of (or together with) the child were examined.  
 
 
5.1 Findings 
 
When child labor migration is regressed on indicators of incentives, constraint 
and agency, the results are only partially consistent with the theory. On some 
points, the expected effects are absent; on others, results are contrary to what 
the theory predicts. In general, the theory turned out to be better suited to 
explain schooling likelihood than child labor and child labor migration 
probabilities. 
 
As predicted, indicators of child labor demand in the local community (amount 
of farm land, cash crop production and livestock) work systematically as 
disincentives for going to school. While they generally did increase the share of 
children who work in and around their own households, they did not have the 
anticipated effect on retaining children from migrating to work. Instead, a rural 
community being highly dependent on agriculture appears as a disincentive for 
girls to stay. While fetching water greatly occupies rural children across Africa, 
the availability of piped water or a village pump surprisingly led to a reduction 
of the share of girls who attended school, and also a reduction of the 
probability that boys labor migrated. The former remains hard to explain, while 
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the latter may be explained by water facilities being a proxy for a somewhat 
higher level of development in the community. The same goes for the presence 
of village markets, which instead of increasing local child labor leads to more 
schooling for both boys and girls. The fact that markets also increase girls’ 
labor migration may be explained by markets also being a place where jobs and 
transportation are mediated, as well as where information about opportunities 
elsewhere is shared. In this sense, markets are places where not only goods are 
traded, but also information and jobs, the latter two depending on social rather 
than financial capital. A high share of fathers living elsewhere does not seem to 
facilitate chain migration, as was assumed. Instead, migrant fathers may 
through their transfers contribute to the schooling of boys. Living far away 
from school reduces the likelihood of schooling, but does not increase labor 
migration.  
 
While poverty definitely seemed to increase the likelihood of girls migrating, it 
did not have the same systematic impact on boys. Child labor research that has 
not taken child labor migration into account has been puzzled by the relatively 
moderate impact that poverty appears to have on child labor. The findings here, 
however, indicate that if the two child labor choices – child labor in the home 
community and child labor away from home – were added up and regressed on 
poverty, the impact of poverty could turn out to be both stronger and more 
statistically significant for both genders.   
 
Curiously, the availability of credit did nothing to reduce child labor migration, 
suggesting that credit is either inaccessible to the poorest households, or 
insufficient to compensate for the opportunity cost of keeping a girl at home – 
even if she works. Credit did, however, help increase girls’ school 
participation. Not so for boys. While poverty reduces their likelihood to attend 
school, credit leads to a further reduction in school attendance instead of 
counteracting the poverty effect. Credit availability also reduces the probability 
 91
that boys labor migrate. In this case credit is possibly invested in assets that are 
labor intensive for boys, such as livestock or land.  
 
Agency issues are complex to interpret, and different for boys and girls. Girls 
are at higher risk of labor migration if coming from households with educated 
mothers, and at lower risk when coming from households with an older 
household head. Boys are at higher risk for labor migration when the household 
head is educated and at lower risk when the mother is older. Boys from female-
headed households are also at high risk. The education of both mother and 
household head not surprisingly has a positive impact on the schooling 
probability of both boys and girls, and the impact is strongest for girls, but all 
children face reduced schooling probabilities when the household head is a 
woman. The different preferences of agents with different features, other things 
held constant, do not necessarily have to do with relative altruism. Educated 
agents may, for instance, be better informed about the pros and cons of the 
various options available to their children and therefore make different choices. 
In that respect, it is remarkable that educated parents seem to prefer child labor 
migration over having children staying to work or idle around the household. 
Very slim support is found for the notion that mothers are more altruistic than 
fathers. The fact that older mothers, who presumably have more bargaining 
power, are less likely to send children away could be interpreted this way. If 
the absent fathers are not overwhelmingly migrants financing their sons’ 
education, the higher schooling likelihood of boys in such households could of 
course also be a result of maternal altruism. But all this is highly speculative, 
and deserves further investigation.  
 
Socio-cultural indicators like geography and religion are important in Benin, in 
particular the former. By far the highest share of children who are labor 
migrants comes from the central region. Muslim children, especially girls, are 
also at heightened risk, followed by Christians, while Animist children have the 
lowest likelihood of labor migration. 
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5.2 Some possible explanations 
 
There may be methodological causes for some of the unexpected findings. 
Adding more community infrastructure variables to the regression equation and 
improving wealth and income measurements could perhaps exclude the 
possibility that some of the findings result from spurious correlations.  
 
But there may also be more fundamental reasons why theory appears to fit 
reality only partially: the theory may have mis-specified the issue the same way 
that child labor issues may be mis-specified throughout the literature. Two 
main topics deserve to be considered in this context, and they interact with each 
other.  
 
First, categorizing children is difficult. Children with some common features 
may be organized in groups that turn out to be highly heterogeneous internally.  
The case of non-biological children of the household head has been mentioned: 
it groups children in educational fostering together with child domestic 
servants. Most operational child labor definitions also mix apples and oranges 
in similar ways: older children earning some cash for their own non-essential 
consumption are mixed with child domestics who slave 24/7 without a salary. 
A child apprentice who feels privileged and loves his work is in the same group 
as a boy weeding the household subsistence farm, learning no marketable skills 
and controlling none of the returns to his own work. Even school children are 
an internally heterogeneous group: children in quality schools are grouped with 
those sitting on the floor in hot and dusty mud-huts with teachers who show up 
on an irregular basis. While certain types of child labor migration may be 
clearly inferior to the first type of schooling, the natural priorities of the 
schooling versus labor migration choice may be less clear in the latter case.  
 
Child labor migrants are likely to be more vulnerable because they often leave 
the safety nets of their families and kin behind. Yet, in spite of this 
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commonality, the various labor migration arrangements discussed in section 
3.3.3 are qualitatively very different. Some of the children who migrate to work 
will indisputably be better off after relocation, both with regards to living 
standards and future prospects. The various determinants of the analysis in this 
thesis are therefore likely to affect the different types of labor migration 
choices differently. 
 
Second, rural parents in West Africa do not necessarily share the western 
normative perceptions of their children’s options that form the theory on which 
this paper is based. In fact, most child labor research takes as a point of 
departure the assumption that child labor is bad and schooling desirable. As 
discussed in section 1.3.3, altruism is truly relative and reflects both the values 
and information level of the subject. Rural parents in Africa may well be ill-
informed. They are for instance likely to be unaware of the long-term health 
consequences of certain types of work common for labor migrants, and to 
underestimate the risks of sending a young child alone to Côte d’Ivoire or 
Gabon. But western scholars may be ill-informed as well. The surprise 
expressed by those finding that orphanhood increases idling rather than child 
labor most likely reflects their underestimation of the value of work where 
schooling is not an option, income is essential, and jobs are few.  
 
Blinded by perceptions of work as undesirable, most theories therefore assume 
that altruistic parents would choose school if they could afford to. The mere 
thought of the risks associated with sending off a 12-year-old to work abroad 
would make most westerners cringe. But while they stress the risks of leaving, 
they may ignore the risks of staying: some rural areas in Africa are indeed so 
risky and destitute that getting the child out of there becomes a priority for 
loving parents and any risk associated with leaving is well worth the 
simultaneous increase in opportunities. It can be as simple as the answer given 
by northern Ghanaian children when asked about the best part of their labor 
migration to cocoa farms: there is always enough to eat.62  
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Parents and other agents are not only likely to value labor migration different 
from western scholars, but they also probably see more nuances both to their 
own situation and to their options. They are therefore also likely to value the 
various types of labor migration quite differently vis-à-vis the available 
versions of the three other options: schooling, staying home to work or just idle 
around their own households. Many types of labor migration will be seen as 
more attractive than staying home to work, and a few may even be regarded as 
better options than the available schooling choice.   
 
Presenting all child labor migrants as one group thus conceals important 
internal variations. The effects measured in some coefficients may actually 
relate to only certain types of child labor migration. As a very simple example: 
the negative impact of wealth on girls’ labor migration may in fact represent a 
reduction only in “undesirable” types of migration, like child domestic 
servitude with low salary among strangers. When mother’s education on the 
other had increases the labor migration of girls, this could reflect an increase in 
the more positive forms, for instance certain types of apprenticeship fostering.  
 
Variation between the quality of labor migration types may also explain some 
of the variations in the coefficients for boys and girls, alongside the different 
ambitions typically held for the two genders and the value they represent to the 
kinship network. If sending girls off to work is a response to poverty constraint 
this may mean that girls are more vulnerable to be expulsed in times of crisis 
because they are “easier to sacrifice”, or that labor migration arrangement for 
girls are in general more risky and less desirable, and that they are thus only 
chosen when constraints impose them.  
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5.3 Policy implications 
 
Do child labor migrants deserve public protection? The answer is yes. Even 
though not all may be needing it, the vulnerability of many and the costs their 
ill fortune has to society in terms of reduced human and social capital 
legitimizes interventions of some sort. However, designing good interventions 
has proven difficult, and the golden rule for policy interventions targeting a 
complex social phenomenon like this is to ensure that the interventions cause a 
minimum of unintended harm, while actually having a positive impact for the 
many. 
 
Social science research often reveals the complexity of life. Policymaking, on 
the other hand, can not afford much complexity, particularly not in a poor 
country like Benin. Sometimes policy makers (and their foreign advisors) may 
be too eager to simplify their messages. Driven by international agendas and 
protected by their ignorance of local complexities, they may overlook the 
potential negative impact that projects may have to the many non-typical cases 
of a phenomenon.  
 
As Castle and Diarra (2002) have shown (discussed in section 1.2), this 
concern is highly relevant in the case of what has generally been labeled “child 
trafficking” in the West African region. Failure to see the distinctions has most 
likely led to negative consequences for many children because criminalizing 
their relocation made it more risky, and therefore raised its cost to the children 
and their families. False documents had to be purchased from crooks. Good 
helpers were scared off, leaving the arena to the bad ones. Social safety nets of 
fellow expatriates in the destination sites were discouraged from helping the 
children in fear of being suspected of intermediation. Good employers were 
deterred, and bad ones took over. People were encouraged to report on each 
other. Finally, some of those given power through the projects have gained an 
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opportunity to earn bribes, and thus alienated the projects even further from the 
population. 
 
A two way communication process is needed in order to lay the ground for a 
policy that is efficient while causing a minimum of harm to children whose 
labor migration does not involve a welfare concern. A common ground must be 
reached where a policy that is well informed but simultaneously easy to 
understand locally can be formulated. Both policy makers and local 
populations must be open and willing to change their perceptions during such a 
process. And they should be, if the common goal is made clear: everybody 
wants healthy, smart and well adjusted children. When child labor migration 
jeopardizes this goal there should be a joint interest in finding a solution. 
Communication is costly, but is one of the main requirements for success.  
 
How can the research of this thesis help the Benin Government and the 
children at risk? The study is mainly helpful in informing preventive efforts, 
since it focuses on the determinants for the decision to migrate rather than on 
working conditions in the destination sites. In the first place, a better 
understanding of the conditions likely to trigger child labor migration can help 
identify high-risk communities and households, and therefore target efforts. 
This is always a concern when resources are far from sufficient to cover needs.  
Also, improved information will help outside actors establish a constructive 
dialogue with local stakeholders (at-risk households, village leaders, social 
communicators, and the community at large).  Knowledge can help formulate 
the right questions, as illustrated by the examples below.   
 
In a superficial discussion in an African village, the main concern brought up is 
likely to be the evident poverty of the place. It is then helpful to know that 
while poverty is probably an important determinant of some of girls’ labor 
migration, something beyond marginal variations to local wealth must explain 
the labor migration of boys. Identifying relevant social policy interventions 
 97
therefore needs further research and local discussion. A fashionable response to 
all sorts of rural poverty issues is the introduction of micro-finance programs. 
However, research findings suggest that credit accessibility does not limit girls’ 
labor migration but actually seems to increase it. Moreover, both the tontine 
and CLCAM seem to reduce boys’ schooling. Therefore, before micro-finance 
schemes are introduced or expanded, it is important to probe this issue further. 
Is credit likely to be invested in labor-demanding assets and businesses that 
will encourage parents to keep boys away from school to wok? Are girls going 
to be sent away to work? Before supporting more micro-finance programs the 
dynamics linking access to credit and child labor migration, in that particular 
community and in general, should be well understood to avoid unwanted 
negative effects on children.  
 
If credit is not an adequate tool for reducing the poverty-induced labor 
migration of girls, then what might be? A better understanding of the types of 
girls’ labor migration that are triggered by poverty would certainly help answer 
that question. If girls are sent into hazardous labor arrangements as a crisis 
coping mechanism for the household, the local safety nets must be strengthened 
to provide alternatives and protect girls from being “sacrificed”. If sending the 
girls off is not the last resort, sensitization and attitude campaigns may be more 
appropriate.  
 
Boys labor migration was reduced when credits were available, but not to the 
benefit of schooling. While working at home should be less risky than working 
away from home, the impact is still not desirable. But why is boys’ labor 
migration insensitive to poverty? If not a crisis coping option, then what? 
During a visit to the Central region of Zou the issue was brought up with a 
group of parents in the village of Zakpota. As usual, local poverty was blamed, 
but when the results of this survey were explained, a different voice was raised. 
“If you don’t have a son in Cote d’Ivoire you don’t count in this village,” said 
the peasant. Qualified and well informed questions are needed in order to bring 
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up such perspectives in the local dialogues. It is possible that some types of 
child labor migration resemble what is well known for adult migration: they are 
status symbols, signaling strength of character, hope and prosperity (“those 
who are strong enough, leave”). A ticket to the lottery.  
 
Schooling availability did not appear to have much of an impact on child labor 
migration. Issues related to school cost (official and non-official fees) and 
quality (infrastructure, curriculum relevance), and other factors that may 
increase the attractiveness of the schooling option relative to the child labor 
migration option should be further assessed and discussed to derive 
recommendations for education policy. Compulsory schooling could be 
considered once enough schools are in place with sufficient capacity to offer 
good quality education to all children. So could conditional cash transfer 
programs when child labor migration is a reaction to economic distress.  
 
Local work opportunities in agriculture did not seem to retain children from 
labor migration. To the contrary, they appear to be dis-incentives for staying 
on. To policy makers this should primarily be an argument for targeting the 
most agricultural based communities. The finding that local markets appear to 
be recruitment grounds for girl migrants suggests that information campaigns 
should target village markets. It is conceivable, for example, to set-up mobile 
teams that would visit communities on market day. Even where there is a daily 
market, there tends to be one day each week when affluence is greatest. 
 
Some central parental agency issues deserve to be scrutinized in the local 
dialogue. What types of vulnerabilities, beyond poverty, appear to be the 
negative triggers in female-headed households, and how can these households 
be helped to become less vulnerable? Why is it that mothers with some 
education prefer to send their daughters on labor migration? And is the labor 
migration of the daughters of mothers with primary education of a better 
quality (i.e., less harmful) than the labor migration of the daughters of mothers 
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without education, so that only the latter should be targeted for prevention?  
The same questions are valid for the labor migration of boys triggered by the 
education of household heads. If indeed better educated parents are more likely 
to send children away to be exposed to detrimental work and other risks, it is 
more difficult to excuse their decision by ignorance.  But only after further 
exploring their decisions and the labor conditions of their children should legal 
regulations be considered. 
 
 
5.4 Recommendations for further research 
 
The objective of the Benin child relocation survey was to enable policy makers 
to quantify child labor migration and child trafficking in the country, identify 
the areas most at risk, and develop an understanding of the reasons behind 
these phenomena. The survey certainly served as an eye-opener as 
extrapolations indicated that around 50,000 Beninese children at that time were 
working outside the borders of the country, and a similar number had relocated 
to work in urban areas within the country. In 2000 it was a surprise to find that 
the main share of the migrants came from the central region, since most 
children intercepted at the frontiers were from the south. Check points, 
however were also mainly in the south, something that would explain the 
misperception.  
 
The new information obtained also gives some general ideas about the 
determinants of child labor migrations. But above all the survey and the 
analysis presented in this thesis raise a range of new questions. These questions 
should guide and inform a dialogue between Government and local 
communities and households at risk, as suggested in the previous section. A 
well informed dialogue will provide new understanding, but new qualitative 
findings should again be quantitatively examined. An extended second survey 
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would be expensive, but would be worth the investment if it could lead to more 
adequate and better targeted interventions.  
 
This thesis suggests several issues that could help improve future child labor 
research, in Benin and elsewhere. The recommendations can be classified in 
five categories as follows.  
 
1. Improving the operational definition of child labor 
a. An extended operational definition of child labor should be 
developed. The issues of child labor migration and home-based 
child labor should be treated in conjunction: no child labor survey 
is complete if it does not also cover the parental choice of 
sending a child away to work. And a child labor migration survey 
also needs to take stock of home-based labor opportunities in 
order to understand parental priorities and thus the labor 
migration choice.  
 
2. Identifying variations within the main outcome categories 
a. What are the main types of child labor available in the local 
communities? Lessons in categorization can be drawn from 
existing time allocation surveys. The pros and cons of each type 
should be identified and rated by representatives of the local 
communities, including returns in cash, kind or educational value 
and the perceived associated risks.  
b. Similarly, the main categories of child labor migration should be 
identified and rated by local representatives.  
c. Improved information on school costs and quality is needed. How 
is the quality of local school buildings? How do parents rate 
curriculum relevance? What is the teacher per child ratio? How 
good and assiduous are the teachers? Is the school private or 
public? What types of school-related expenses do parents incur?  
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d. How do parents perceive the children that are reported as neither 
working nor going to school? Is it leisure, laziness, 
unemployment or hidden work in their opinion? 
e. In short, what different labor, labor migration, schooling and 
leisure options does the individual household perceive for its 
children, and how does it rate these options? Hopefully, this type 
of information will help policymakers understand how incentives 
to schooling can be improved relative to the various other options 
for the use of children’s time.  
 
3. Understanding costs, risks and opportunities related to child relocation  
a. What are the relocation costs when a child migrates to work? Do 
parents send money with the departing child, and do they have 
other expenses related to the child’s departure? Do they pay for 
transportation? Does the child know people or have relatives at 
the destination site? Did the child have a specific job to go to 
when leaving?  
b. What sort of risks do the parents foresee when a child is to 
relocate, and how are these risks perceived relative to the risks of 
staying?  
c. What are the longer term benefits and opportunities envisioned 
when a child is sent on labor migration?  
d. Are there other push factors in the home community that need to 
be considered when analyzing the child labor migration choice? 
 
4. Understanding wealth and endogeneity issues 
a. In order to better understand endogeneity issues, transfers 
between parents and the various types of child labor migrants 
should be mapped. Transfers can go both ways and can be in cash 
or kind. They can take place on a monthly, seasonal or random 
basis, or in situations of special need.  
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b. Ideally a full consumption module could be added to the future 
survey in order to study the ratio of child-related versus adult-
related expenditures in the various income categories. As a 
minimum, indicators of household alcohol and tobacco 
consumption could be included to better assess hypotheses of 
parental altruism.  
c. A set of survey questions that could serve as instrument variables 
for a less endogenous wealth/income assessment should be 
defined and included.  
d. The whereabouts of fathers who are absent from the maternal 
household and their relationship to migrant (and home-based) 
children should be clarified. How many fathers are labor 
migrants? Are there transfers in cash or kind from the absent 
fathers to the maternal households?  
e. Beyond knowing what type of credit is available in a community, 
it is important to know whether anyone in the household had used 
such credit, and if yes, what for.   
 
5. Reducing the likelihood of spurious correlations 
a. Including good community infrastructure variables could help 
ensure that the results on variables indicating both incentives 
(e.g., markets and access to water) and constraint (wealth 
measurements and credit availability), are not actually 
expressions of community level features unaccounted for in the 
equation.  
b. Similarly, agency features (especially female household head) 
may have spurious correlations with poverty and vulnerability 
issues unaccounted for in current wealth and income 
measurements. Communication with at-risk communities could 
help reveal what types of vulnerabilities this might be. 
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Endnotes  
                                                   
1 These are household data, and children living outside regular households are not 
counted here. There are some street children in Benin, yet others live in workshops, at 
commercial farms, in Koranic schools and boarding schools, etc. and these would not 
be included.  
2 For the purpose of this thesis the category was defined as a child between 6 and 17 
who is either married to the household head, married to someone else in the 
household, grandchild of the household head, brother or sister of the household head 
or his/her spouse or some other member of the household, has a more remote or no 
relationship to the household head. Children classified as household head, child of 
household head, child of a spouse or of other household member were counted as 
living at home. The category “child of some other member of the household” 
organizes before the “grandchild” category, and it is therefore likely that if the mother 
or father lives in the household, the child would not have been assigned the value of 
“grandchild”. The classification characterizes 24 percent of the working children as 
“non-school, non-biological children of the household head”. 
3 Kielland and Ouensavi (2000).  
4 See argument by Castle and Diarra (2002). 
5 This will be further explored in section 2.1.1. 
6 They mainly work as domestic servants in private and relatively poor households, or 
for small farmers.  
7 BBC Focus on Africa, July – September 2001. 
8 CNN, April 15, 2001. The so-called “Etireno Slave Ship” was one among many 
passenger boats that also bring prospective child domestic servants from Benin to 
Gabon.  
9 Reynolds (1991) for instance finds that girls preparing lunch was not counted even 
by the girls themselves when reporting on their labor activities.  
10 Nielsen (1998) includes indicators of distance both measured in km and minutes, 
and finds that the coefficients for the two take opposite directions. It raises the 
question of whether issues of multi-colinearity may be involved when two such 
similar indicators are included in the same equation.  
11 Grootaert (1998) argues for using a sequential probit model to assess child labor, 
analyzing first the schooling choice, then excluding the children who only go to 
school from the sample before analyzing the choice of combining school with work, 
excluding those doing both before finally analyzing the work choice in comparison to 
being inactive. One of his arguments for the sequential probit is that irrelevant 
variables can be excluded in ceratin steps of the procedure. He thus excludes variables 
of schooling costs and distance from the “only work” equation. In comparison he 
includes multinomial logistic regression analyses (that he finds inferior to the 
sequential probit approach) in the appendix of his paper. Ironically, both school costs 
and distance turn out to be statistically significant to the child labor choice in those 
regressions, seriously questioning his assumption of their irrelevance.  
12 The presence of public transport could of course also serve as a relatively strong 
proxy of community infrastructure. 
13 The probit model moreover predicts best when the outcome distribution is fifty-
fifty, and therefore consistently under-predicts the incidence of child labor where it is 
not too common.  
14 Grootaert (1998:pp29-30) does not find it appropriate to include an income variable 
in the child labor equation, admitting the likelihood of endogeneity. Nevertheless, his 
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poverty dummy is, as pointed out by Bhalotra and Heady (2001:p5, footnote 6) of 
course endogenous as well. The low impact found may therefore be related to 
endogeneity issues.  
15 Hamilton’s rule is (in brief) that a costly action should be performed if; C < R x B 
where C is the cost to the actor, R the genetic relatedness between the actor and the 
recipient and B is the benefit to the recipient. 
16 There is no page number on the Abstract page. 
17 See ILO; Every Child Counts (2003), and Investing in Every Child (2004). 
18 ILO Convention 182, article 4d. 
19 While labor market research is manly concerned with productivity, child labor 
research is mainly concerned with welfare consequences for children. In that context, 
carrying water to livestock and carrying water for household consumption makes little 
difference to the child in question.  
20 In Kielland and Tovo (2006) we propose a list of 35 factors that can make any labor 
situation harmful to children. In addition to some more commonly used indicators of 
the nature of work and the labor situation; features of the child – like health condition 
– are calculated in.  
21 Full name: UN Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children to the UN Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime. 
22 For a broader discussion of the definition, see UNICEF, ICDC (2004). 
23 U.S. Department of State (2005). 
24 In the new cocoa certification surveys on child labor in Ghana and Cote d’Ivoire 
some general indicators of force and deception, debt bondage and deprivation of 
freedom of movement are included.   
25 A notable exception is the econometric work on bargaining models and child 
agency of Vegard Iversen (2002a).  
26 Bhalotra and Heady (2001) use both “number of hours worked” and “labor 
participation” as dependent variables, and find the regression results to be strikingly 
similar. Labor participation thus seems to be a good proxy in the identification of 
determinants that trigger the types of child labor that should be a welfare concern.   
27 As concrete examples of this, a Beninese family may consider it more important to 
pay for a spectacular funeral ceremony or commemoration for an important relative, 
than to pay school tuition for a child, since such ceremonies are of high importance in 
the country, and the social pressure is often very strong.   
28 An interesting example of this is Pakistan where children were often placed in debt 
bondage because families needed to borrow money to organize lavish weddings for an 
older son. Social pressure for these very costly events was such that the Government 
decided to prohibit food serving in weddings, that way relaxing the financial 
expectation on poor parents and resolving much of the child bondage problem. 
29 Examples of such dis-saving of human capital is typically to eat less, take the 
children out of school, and/or involve adults or children in risky or harmful labor. 
30 Several NGO reports have referred to negative schooling effects among children of 
mothers who have received micro credit or support for income generating activities 
(IGAs). See e.g. Bozzari (2003) from Niger. 
31 For example: the eastern city of Porto Novo in Benin is a destination site for 
Togolese child domestics. When rumor spread that salary for child domestics had 
increased by approximately CFA 1000 in Lagos (on the other side of the Nigerian 
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border) migration flows going through Porto Novo towards Lagos increased. It is also 
likely that more children left home when salaries increased.  
32 E.g. a rural girl from Ghana tells Beauchemin (1999) that she would rather sleep in 
the street in a city than to stay in the countryside under the life conditions there.  
33 Castle and Diarra (2002) quote a Babmbara proverb “Ni tara toungala, ni ma fen 
soro, i be fen ye, i be fen don”, meaning: If you go on labor migration, even if you 
don’t get rich, you will see something, you will learn something. 
34 There was a random sampling of rural communities in each of the 6 departments of 
the country, and a systematic over-sampling of areas that were pre-defined as 
potential risk zones (extrapolations referred to in 1.1.4 were later corrected for 
sampling biases). In each community households were randomly selected, and all 
mothers in each household were asked to report on their children, regardless of the 
mother’s status in the household or relationship to household head. Efforts were also 
made to capture children of deceased mothers who had been belonging to the 
household, by asking at least two other mothers to report on the whereabouts of their 
children. 
35 In Benin the four levels of organizing population groups are villages, communes, 
sous-prefectures and departments.  At the time of the survey there were 6 
departments, there are today 12.  
36 Ninety-two percent of 0-2-year-olds and 73 percent of 3-5-year-old children of 
separated parents live with their mothers (DHS 2001). Beninese law does not grant 
women the right to their children in case of separation unless the parents’ marriage 
was legally formalized. When it is not, men have the customary claim. Even when 
marriages are formalized (which is quite rare) women do not often use the legal 
system to compete for custody. 
37 Evidence of the statistical impact on schooling stemming from the absence of a 
mother relative to a father is presented e.g. by Case et al’s (2002) in depth analysis of 
country data from 19 DHS studies in 10 African countries. Moreover, Alderman et al 
(1995), Ilahi (2000), Quisumbing and Maluccio (1999) note that the increased 
bargaining power of women in a household correlates positively with children’s 
schooling as well as other child consumption. Se also Cockburn 2000. 
38 ILO Convention 182 and related documents like “Every Child Counts” suggests 
type and duration of work by age bracket to define what constitutes child labor.  
39 Applying three different measurement instruments in her observations of child 
labor in the Zambezi Valley, Reynolds (1991) finds that girls themselves often 
underreport their work, while their brother’s had sometimes registered the activities 
that their sisters’ had left out in their diary notes.  
40 In particular, many girls go from Benin to Gabon to be domestic servants, since in 
Gabon almost all children are in school. Studies have revealed that the children who 
stay with ex pat Beninese families are not more protected than those staying in 
Gabonese homes. To the contrary, they seem to be treated worse by their own 
kinsmen (Fannou-Ako and Adihou. (1999).).  
41 The estimates were prepared for a presentation made at the World Bank. The 
presentation can be obtained upon request.  
42 The salary of a child domestic servant in Gabon is for instance equivalent to the 
wages of an average civil servant in Benin (Fannou-Ako andAdihou (1999)).  
43 In fact, the dataset contains a question about household savings, and also one about 
expenditures for traditional ceremonies, but due to the problems explained, these are 
not considered reliable, and thus omitted in the analysis. 
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44 In relation to this study the author had a discussion about the relative importance of 
the various indicators with Beninese consultant Martine de Souza who has 
considerable field experience with the type of households in question. The final 
decisions are in other words also informed by this consultation.  
45 Table 3.2 shows that half the households fall in the upper category, but these are of 
course households with few children. Contrary to the other indicators that give 
reasonably equal results for children and households, this way of dividing the rooms-
per-child brackets divide the children – the main unit of analysis - into three relatively 
equal groups. 
46 Both fertility and room size are admittedly potentially endogenous in a child labor 
migration regression, but should be less critical when included as a minor part of an 
index.  
47 In Benin, a rural girl 6-17 years old spend on average slightly more than 1 hour per 
day fetching water, a rural boy on average slightly less than half-an-hour.   
48 This is common e.g. in construction, for carpenters, tailors, mechanics and 
hairdressers.  
49 See Plan Togo’s “For the Price of a Bike” report. 
50 The general term for this type of arrangement is ROSCA: rotating savings and 
credits associations. 
51 Having a female household head may e.g. affect credit access, job opportunity and 
social participation.  
52 In this case the rank is counted only among children currently 0-18 years old, 
starting with the youngest, and should be less endogenous than e.g. “total number of 
children” and certain other fertility measurements.  
53 Sample sizes are also small for many of the smaller ethnic groups.  
54 North is defined as the two northern departments of Atacora and Borgou, Central as 
the department of Zou, and South as the remaining three departments Oueme, Mono 
and Atlantique.  
55 The possibility of endogeneity is of course also present here (buying more cattle 
because there are children available to herd them and the return to child labor can be 
used on buying more cattle for them to herd), but would have been particularly so if 
considering the effect of individual household livestock ownership. 
56 In neighboring Togo an inversed u-shaped relationship was found between the 
distance to water and children’s participation in fetching it.  
57 Also: the water policy in Benin requires villages to contribute 100.000 CFA before 
coming to do a borehole, so the poorest and smallest villages would not have a one. 
58 In conversations parents often complained to us that the children felt too good for 
farming as soon as they had learned French.  
59 One such cultural feature may be the demand for girls to earn a dowry.  
60 The author’s local assistant was constantly approached by mothers and girls when 
we were visiting local markets in the center and north. Out of habit, she would stop to 
negotiate and review the girl the same way she would with other potential bargains 
presented to her. As is common in urban areas, she normally has at least two girls 
staying with her to help out in her store and household.  
61 This was for instance found in northern Mali, and has been referred to in World 
Bank poverty assessments for the country. 
62 See report from Department of Social Work, University of Ghana (2007). 
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